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THE GOLDEN EGGS: A STUDY IN TRAGELAPHINE
ANATOMY
By C. A. PEAIRS, JR.t
PART II: THE F. T. C. VERSUS THE DELIVERED PRICE-A STUDY
IN TERRITORIAL ISOLATION *
"Iron and Steel Are Hard to Get, Hard to Get, Hard to Get,"
London Bridge, Traditional.
The first part of this study was concerned with the rate charged
by the carrier, within the context of the Interstate Commerce Act;
the discussion to follow will treat and contrast the problem of the ship-
per in passing those rates on to his customers, within the limits per-
missible under the applicable statutes, satellites in our system
of anti-monopoly legislation.
In turning to this second phase of the problem we cannot focus
our attention on a single key case, like New York v. United States,'
as embodying the current law and reasoning of the Supreme Court on
the point, and as illustrating the bases for criticism as well. In treating
the law of delivered price systems, we are confronted with a complex
of cases, not dominated by any single policy-forming decision, but each
shedding a significant part of the light thrown off by the group: the
Syrup cases,' 67 the Cement case,' 6 ' the Steel Pipe case,'69 the Lead
case,170 (the latter not fully developed), in the outer fringes of the con-
stellation an auxiliary, the Salt case,' 7' and far in the background the
Steel case.' 72 Not all these are Supreme Court decisions on delivered
price systems, but each contributes to the aggregate effect of the com-
plex.
Before proceeding to trace the development of these cases, how-
ever, it may be well to sketch the background of the problem of basing
* Part I, The I.C.C. Versus The Zone Freight Rate: A Study In Territorial
Subsidy, appeared in the November issue of the current volume, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv.
125 (1950).
t Professor of Law, Boston University Law School.
166. 331 U.S. 284 (1946).
167. Corn Products Refining Co. v. F.T.C., 324 U.S. 726 (1945); F.T.C. v.
Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945). See notes 233 and 240 infra.
168. F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). See notes 223 and 254
infra.
169. 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd per nec., 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
170. F.T.C. Doc. No. 4878.
171. F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). See also Standard Oil v.
F.T.C., infra at note 238.
172. 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924). See note 210 infra.
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point and other delivered price systems, as results of marketing policies
and external circumstances, and as objects of governmental condemna-
tion.
DELIVERED PRICE SYSTEMS: THE PROBLEM
The Impact of Regulation on Policy
The issue of the basing point cases concerns the legitimacy of a
pricing policy used by a few industries whose peculiar marketing cir-
cumstances dictate a departure from standard pricing practices. These
standard practices, the reference point by which deviational conduct in
marketing is judged, operate in the simplest situation as a resultant
vector of three basic principles which have largely influenced the de-
velopment of commercial pricing policies in this Country:
(1) Maximum return,"74
(2) Uniformity, 7 ' and
(3) Discount.'70
These have functioned uniformly within the classical marketing struc-
ture echeloned, as the simplest case, into manufacturer, wholesalers,
and retailers, although they have been subject to some artificial vari-
ants, such as advertising, 177 or special auxiliary services granted by the
173. See the following for descriptions of the standard marketing pattern: DUDDY
AND REVZAN, MARKETING (1947); MAYNARD, WEIDLER AND BECKMAN, PRINCIPLES OF
MARKETING (3d ed. 1939); PHILUPS AND DUNCAN, MARKETING (1948); PYLE,
MARKETING PRINCIPLES (Rev. ed. 1936).
174. Starting from the premise that human nature, at least in the long run, will
lead traders to try to exact the maximum profits from their enterprises, this basic
principle, that sellers will charge what the market will bear, may be enunciated. The
flower vendors along Boston's Federal Street follow this principle to the exclusion of
the next one, raising their prices before holidays and on Fridays, and lowering them
on rainy days or on a sliding scale from 4:30 to 5:30 p.m.
175. This, the fixed-price principle, is a phenomenon of the Western world (as
distinct from that of Oriental commerce, where the art of individual bargaining has
been developed to probably its highest peak) and is most highly developed as a prin-
ciple of American commerce. See, e.g., NAT. IND. CONF. BOARD, PUBLIC REGULATION
oF CoMPETITIVE PRACTICEs 69 (1929) (referred to also in McLAUGHLIN, CASES ON
THE FEDERAL ANTI TRUST LAWS 424 n. 119 (2d ed. 1933)) on this point. The Oriental
mores in this respect are illustrated nicely by the anecdotes in FULANAIN, HAJI
RIKKAN, MARSH ARAB (1932), of which perhaps the most pointed is that of a Haji
merchant in the Fertile Crescent area, where religious feelings run high, who utilized
his status to assume to sell places in Paradise, and thus monopolized the available
spending money in the market, only to lose it after a Christian merchant competitor,
representing that he realized that there was no place for him in the Mohammedan
paradise, purchased instead all of Hell, and then advertised that he had done so, and
that there were consequently no places left there.
176. On the economic background of discounts and discount policies see PHILLIPS
AND DUNCAN, op. cit. sapra note 173, at 666-73; MAYNARD, WEIDLER AND BECKMAN,
op. cit. supra note 173, at 518 (functional discounts) and 520 (quantity discounts);
AGNEW AND HOUGHTON, MARKETING POLICIES c. 13 "Price Policies and Trade Dis-
counts" (1941); Agnew, Quantity Discount Survey, Bull. Nat'l Ass'n Marketing
Teachers (1934); DUDDY AND REVZAN, op. cit. supra note 173, at 509-11; see also
Till, The Fiction of the Quoted Price, 4 LAW & CONT iP. PROB. 363 (1937).
177. Used as an induction coil, or as a supercharger to raise performance above
the merit base.
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seller in connection with the articles sold.1 ' The uncomplicated picture
of a sale process divided up into three distinct phases, each one capable
of description as a slight modification of the simplest marketing situa-
tion, and of the three as a trinity inseparable and indispensable, underlies
much of Government thinking and writing, sacred and profane, in this
field. Where these three marketing levels and the distinction between
them break down, however, so also do some of the mechanisms set up
to control prices and geared to this scheme of things. A good portion
of the regulatory law dealing with prices rests on the premise that
parallel sales lines are equidistant, and that other patterns are a priori
subject to suspicion.1 9  Extensions of functions by the manufacturer
or retailer to eliminate the wholesaler, or to re-establish the primitive
sale channel from the manufacturer direct to consumer-vertical inte-
gration ..0 and variations in marketing organization and in the division
of marketing functions, are alike viewed with hostility, which has been
only partially formulated into specific regulations of trade practice.
These specific, tangible regulations are, however, the starting point in
measuring the development of the policies which came into conflict in
the basing point cases.
It is obvious that governmental regulation will play a part in the
determination of pricing policies in any area of commerce, to the extent
that such regulation is present. The only variable is the degree of
regulation, that is, the extent to which governmental regulation of
marketing approaches governmental price fixing.
Historical examples of price control and price fixing go all the
way back to the book of Genesis, in the career of Joseph in Egypt, and
are found in later days in the time of Diocletian, in medieval Spain,
and in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, as well as in this
country.' 8 ' These historical examples serve only to indicate that price
fixing may be an inherent function of sovereignty, and not necessarily
178. Or special terms of purchase, which may serve either to raise or to lower the
effective price charged.
179. Burns, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 312 (1937) ; McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs and the
Robinson-Patinan Act, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334 (1937) ; see Kaylin, Retailing
Under the Patman Act in BUSINESS AND THE ROBINSoN-PATMAN AcT 132-141
(Werne ed. 1938); NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, PUBLIC REGULATION
OF COmPETITIvE PRACTIcES xvi-xx, 3, 81 (3d ed. 1940). It may be suggested that this
reasoning includes what Professor Fuller has called the "static pie" fallacy: The
Places and Uses of Jurisprudence, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495, 498 (1949).
180. See PHILLIPS AND DUNCAN, op. cit. sitpra note 173, c. 10, 12, 13, dealing
with the chain store, the mail order house, and direct sale to consumers. The currently
notorious problem is that raised by the anti-trust suit against the A. & P. chain stores.
This case has not progressed far enough for complete development in the reports, but
a succinct statement of the issues will be found in Time, Sept. 26, 1949.
181. See ROHLFING, CARTER, WEST & HERVEY, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 511-
512 (1938).
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that it is a desirable function in a government system conceived under
a presumption, however weak, of laissez faire.
Price controls in this country existed in Revolutionary times and
shortly thereafter, and they may be supposed to have been assumed as
a basis for government by the Founding Fathers, familiar as they were
with practices in Colonial and Revolutionary times.182 However, price
control disappeared, whether due to the indirect effect of provisions
written into the Constitution 18 or to the gradual pervasion of laissez
faire thinking inherent in the economic growth of a new country,
hostile to such governmental curbs. 18 4  The only area in which during
the first half and more of the nineteenth century price controls were
commonly employed was in the field of transportation.'$5
The modern law of price regulation in this country can be said
to have its roots in the political upheavals of the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, of which the Sherman Act 186 was one of the first
major positive-law symptoms, if not exactly a calculated result. The
Sherman Act was directed at monopolistic combinations. Restraint of
trade was the antagonist, but free competition, the protagonist, was at
least partially a political stalking horse, for the interests which were
rampant at the time were not primarily the small business interests,
frozen out by private curbs on competition, but consumer interests:
labor elements, and, much more important at the time, farm elements,
both concerned basically with consumer price levels. The Sherman
Act, then, although a price-fixing act only in a limited sense, rested to
a considerable extent on price regulation interest, and its enforcement
often resulted in curbs on pricing policies, direct or indirect, and often
involved litigation concerning the propriety of pricing policies, par-
ticularly those involving agreements or combinations supporting given
policies.1
8 7
182. An excellent historical treatment of the price control function in this country
is McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
273, 274-275 (1937).
183. No provision would seem directly to bar either state or Federal controls.
184. See McAllister, op. cit. supra note 182, at 276.
185. Id. at 276-280.
186. 26 STAr. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1946). See generally on the applica-
tion of this Act the Symposium, The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Its Enforcement, 7
LAW & CONTEMP. PROs. No. 1 (1940). Cases 'discussing the application of anti-trust
policy to pricing practices include F.T.C. v. Beech Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441
(1927) ; United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) ; Frey & Son v.
Cudahy Pkg. Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921) ; United States v. Colgate Co.. 250 U.S. 20)
(1919). See also Bums, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regdation of Price Competi-
tion, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 301 (1937).
187. See cases cited note 186 supra; see also Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925), discussed below, for an example of an attempted
application of the Act to basing point pricing policies. The influence of combination
on prices was a major point in the prosecution in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
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If the Sherman Act was the grandfather of the statutory provi-
sions supporting the recent basing point price cases, the Clayton Act,'88
a quarter of a century later, was the parent. The key provision of the
Clayton Act is present in section 2, outlawing price discrimination
which may substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly.
It was under this section that the case law problems of two decades
arose, including questions of propriety of trade discounts, quantity dis-
counts, brokerage allowances, advertising allowances, and similar prac-
tices not tied to any individual discriminatory intent or to any monopo-
listic purpose. 8 9 There were specific savings clauses in the statute to
cover some of these practices to the extent that they were reasonable, 19
and the result was a general rule of reason in the field of pricing prac-
tices somewhat similar to that adopted in connection with industrial
combinations under the Sherman Act; that is, price differentials result-
ing from circumstances inherent in the commercial situation were not
condemned by the courts, but the scope of the Act was considered to be
limited to practices individually oppressive in character, or tied into
schemes to reduce competition generally or to create monopoly gen-
erally.' 9 '
The Clayton Act was on the books for over two decades before
the next major step was taken, in the form of the Robinson-Patman
amendment. 92  The wartime era 193 which followed each so closely
served to allow the philosophy of these Acts to percolate into the con-
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106 (1911) (both leading cases under the Act). See also Continental Wallpaper
Co. v. Voight & Co., 212 U.S. 227 (1909) ; United States v. Addyston Steel Co., 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
188. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-26 (1946) ; 38 STAT. 740
(1914), 15 U.S.C. §27 (1946).
189. See I.B.M. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) ; Standard Fashion
Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922) (monopoly of purchasers) ; Porto
Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929)
(price cutting) ; Lord v. R.C.A., 24 F.2d 565. af'd, 28 F.2d 257 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
278 U.S. 648 (1928) (tie-in sales). Discounts are discussed, and authorities cited, in
McAllister, supra note 182, at 312-315. A number of leading cases are collected and
usefully annotated in OPPENHEIM, CASES ON TRADE R. GuLATiOx 918 (1936).
190. These are discussed in McAllister, supra note 182; Burns, supra note 186;
and in McAllister, Sales Policies and Price Discrimination Under the Clayton Act,
41 YALE L.J. 518 (1932).
191. MacLachlan (ni McLaughlin. See HANNA AND MAcLAcHLAN, CASES AND
MATERIAL ON CmITORS' RIGHTS viii n. 2 (4th ed. 1948). The older spelling is used
herein as a matter of bibliographical convenience.), The Courts and the Robinson-
Patntan Act, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 410 (1937) (dealing primarily with Clayton
Act interpretation). He predicts here a similar approach under the Robinson-Patman
Act, as does NORWOOD, TRADE PRACtICE AND PaicE LAW 121 (1938) : "We may safely
banish any vague fear of hidden meanings and drastic decisions and apply the practical
common sense measurements which have been used by the courts and by businessmen
from time immemorial."
192. 49 STAT. 1256 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 21 (1946).
193. Commencing in April, 1917 and June, 1940 respectively.
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sciousness of the country for some time before vigorous enforcement
proceedings had to be commenced to prevent the legislation from be-
coming stale. Further, in the case of the Robinson-Patman Act, an
additional impetus was provided by the wartime price controls, which
were imposed to a far greater extent than during World War I. These
ran interference for the Robinson-Patnan Act in popularizing a sense
of unfairness in price discrimination, a task which might otherwise
have been uphill work for the Federal Trade Commission. This is
not to say that 0. P. A.' precedents influenced Supreme Court think-
ing as an extra-judicial factor in the recent price cases, but merely that
price controls could be tightened to the full extent justified under the
legislation with less disturbance of individual economic practices than
would have been true had businessmen not been habituated to the same
sort of thinking under the 0. P. A.
The Robinson-Patman amendment added little substantively to
the anti-price discrimination rules contained in the Clayton Act and in
the Federal Trade Commission Act, considering the latter two acts in
sum. The big difference stemmed from the fact that under the Clayton
Act it was necessary to prove the monopolistic effect or the injury to
competition resulting from any price discrimination shown, and pos-
sibly also to show combination or collusion rather than individual ac-
tion in the discrimination complained of."9 5 Under the Robinson-
Patman Act the burden of proof was shifted to the defendant in any
case in which price discrimination was shown, to negative injury to
competition or to show that the discrimination should be found within
one of the savings clauses relating to meeting competition and similar
situations." 6 This presumption of injury to competition may also
have had the effect of outlawing individual price discrimination, as
distinct from that resulting from conspiracy, combinations, or collusion.
The extent to which this suggestion can be borne out is probed in the
study of the basing point cases.
In general evaluation of governmental programs in price fixing,
price control, and lesser form of price regulation, it can be noted that
the effectiveness of Governmental control depends on the degree of
economic pressure it generates and not on the severity or breadth of
the controls exercised. Where the controls run sharply counter to the
economic interests of those engaged in the market, opposition will not
194. Under 56 STAT. 23 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 901 (1946) and enabling
executive orders.
195. Under Sec. 2 of the Act. A good discussion of the proof requirements is
found in Am. Can Co. v. Lagoda Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930).
196. Including justifiable discounts. See cases cited note 189 supra. On this
burden of proof as to quantity discounts, see F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37
(1948), and its discussion in Merrigan, infra notes 236, 275.
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stop in the political arena, but may be expected to continue as an,
obstacle to enforcement. Areas of competition may shift, and this may
achieve the Governmental purposes in many cases, although it is cer-
tainly not explicit in the case of the Federal Trade Commission that its
prime objective is to protect the consumer by stimulating non-price
competition, and it is not clear whether without additional controls em-
phasis on non-price competition is actually a boon to the consumer.
The second big result, however, of price controls which set up business
barriers between willing purchasers and willing sellers, is the black
market, which was observed during the French Revolutionary period,"9 7
and again with almost equal intensity in the Western Europe of 1944-
1947,198 and which cannot be ascribed entirely to Latin mores or
temperament, as experience in this Country has shown. It may, then,
be said generally that price controls can be completely effective so long
as they do not run directly counter to economic pressures, and perhaps
partially so even beyond that point; but what can be achieved by the
Government in shifting markets or in shifting wealth within this effec-
tive area is also strictly limited.
Basing Point Prices
In any price structure the question is likely to arise, whether trans-
portation costs from seller to buyer shall be taken into account in fixing
the price exacted. Shall one buyer be charged more than another, be-
cause it costs more to ship the product sold to him than to the other,
or shall the same price be charged both irrespective of transportation
costs? This question underlies the entire problem of delivered price
systems, of which the basing point systems are the heated areas, not
differing greatly otherwise from other such systems. The answer to
these questions opens the door to such chambers of horrors as the cost
accounting laboratory 9 and the temple of free competition. It also
will be affected by the need, in enterprises of a marginal economic
character, for a minimum level of profit, and on the other hand by the
always-present American principle of uniformity of price.
In most industries the answer is simple: transportation is a negli-
gible factor, not readily differentiated from other elements in marketing
costs, even if distinct from production costs; it will be disregarded as
a separate factor, and a uniform delivered price will be charged, to
avoid unfortunate customer reaction to apparent discrimination and to
197. See ROHLFING, op. cit. supra pote 181, at 522.
198. And later. See Life, Dec. 5, 1949, p. 131.
199. See p. 148 supra.
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facilitate advertising on a nation-wide basis (if such advertising is to
include price information).
In an industry whose production is very bulky or very heavy, so
that transportation costs assume major significance in relation to cost
of materials or expense of fabrication, then more serious attention must
be given to this question, who shall pay the freight? If transportation
is a significant factor in cost, then it becomes a significant factor in
regulating competition, as it increases the area in which efficiency can-
not serve to limit cost. In such an industry the producer who is close
to the consumer is obviously at an advantage, granted free competi-
tion with no circumstantial, monopolistic, or legal restrictions on pric-
ing policies. But consumers are usually not concentrated in one
locality; while in such industries the producers are themselves closely
located in areas nearby the source of weighty or bulky raw materials."'
To trace the development of pricing policy in such an industry it
may be helpful to consider an illustrative hypothetical manufacturer,
bearing in mind that this picture may involve some oversimplification.
The A manufacturer, then, finds available three possible price policies
in a new market area:
(a) F. 0. B. pricing,
(b) Delivered pricing, or
(c) Some other pricing policy.
F. 0. B. pricing has proved ineffective as against competitors who are
nearer the customer, because in the A industry transportation costs are
a more important item than possible variations in quality between the
product (a standard one) of A and of his competitors. A decides,
then, to discard F. 0. B. pricing, in order to meet competition while
still maintaining uniformity. Delivered prices, on the other hand, have
proved unfortunate for A's predecessors, because they provided no
profit margin sufficient to meet price-cutting competition, or because
in areas where minimum profit ratios are expected. It is then deter-
mined to discard delivered pricing as A's policy, and concluded that
probably some other pricing policy must be adopted; but what other
pricing policy?
The desired price must be one which meets the following require-
ments:
(a) It must provide a sufficiently low price at distant points
to enable A Company to meet competition;
200. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COM-
PETITIVE PRACTISES 115, 116 n. 1 (3d ed. 1940). See also id. at 106.
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(b) It must provide a sufficiently high price elsewhere to
balance the loss from individual transactions at a great distance,
in order that A may have a healthy large volume of steady custom-
ers at a sufficient over-all profit margin to sustain the A enter-
prise;
(c) It must be based on a simple formula, so that salesmen
use it and customers understand it without resort to complex com-
putations which would in themselves scare off customers and in-
crease administration costs in correcting the errors of arithmetic-
shy salesmen;
(d) It must be demonstrably impartial, so that customers
may understand that net price differentials are based on circum-
stances and not on personality; that is, it must render reasonable
compliance with the principle of uniformity.
The answer which A actually developed in this situation, in many
an industry in this country, was the so-called basing point price system,
under which the price to any customer was the mill net price plus the
freight from some pre-established point (the basing point but not
necessarily the actual point of shipment) to the point of delivery.20 1
This system, with its variations, met the requirements better than any
other system tried.
Two matters should be especially noted in connection with the
initial adoption by any industry of a basing point price system. First,
any sale might involve a charge for freight in excess of or less than
the actual freight from point of shipment to destination. The excess
freight can be understood as coming under the principle of exacting all
that the traffic will bear; but the willingness of industry to con-
tinue the absorption of freight, where the freight charge is less than
the actual freight, must be specially explained. In industries of this
sort, where fabrication expenses are slight and raw materials not a
great item in relation to transportation, the entire unit cost is normally
low. Consequently, a large volume of business must be maintained
by any individual company in order to remain alive. This may make
it worthwhile to keep on customers whose accounts do not show cur-
rently a net profit, in order to maintain a desirable over-all volume of
operations and to provide a cushion in number of customers against
anticipated business slumps. The problem of required volume of
201. On the economic backgrounds of basing point pricing see id. at 104, and ma-
terials cited; NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION, REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF
THE BASING POINT SYSTEM IN THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, ch. 1 (1934). Means,
infra note 207; Withrow, infra note 208, at 692. For a brief treatment of the problem
of legality prior to the Robinson-Patman Act, see Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 548 (1932).
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business in an industry with a low production cost is a key factor in
the adoption and maintenance of any basing point pricing system." 2
Second, basing point prices will prove economically feasible and desir-
able only under the special circumstances of the type case described
above: that is, where the product to be marketed is standardized and
has a great unit weight or unit bulk, and where raw material and fabri-
cation costs are low enough that transportation costs form a significant
portion of the total price to be charged. Such industries are perhaps
not few enough to be excepted from general policy and treated on an
ad hoc basis, but it may be worthy of inquiry whether they are too
few to be considered typical, and too few to furnish a proper factual
basis for the regulation of marketing policies generally. The limited
area of incidence of the basing point price policy tends to specialize the
proper scope of regulatory precedents derived from it, although of
course regulations and decisions issued without limiting language must
be considered as not subject to such limitation.
In the history of basing point prices in the United States three
general types have come into use : 203
(1) The Single Basing Point Price System. This system, some-
times called the "Pittsburgh-plus" system because of its close associa-
tion with pricing policies in the steel industry, operates as follows:
Each seller selects a single point, the "basing point," from which
all transportation charges will be figured in sales made by it. This
basing point is typically the site of the principal shipping point operated
by the seller; but it may be arbitrarily selected-for instance, the
national center of population for the time being, or the geographical
center of the country, might be selected and serve a similar purpose.
If the seller operates more than one mill as a shipping point, then the
result of the system will be that the transportation charged in sales
involving shipment from non-basing-point mills may be either greater
or less than the actual freight rates from the shipping mill to the buyer,
and will only be by coincidence the same amount-as in the case of a
sale to a buyer located midway between the basing point and the actual
point of shipment. In case the freight charged, calculated from the
basing point, is greater than the actual freight rate from the point of
shipment to the destination, the amount of such excess is commonly
referred to as "phantom freight". In case the freight actually charged
202. See PHILLIPS AND DUNCAN, MARKETING 674 (1948).
203. The flat delivered price, although considered by many to be outlawed along
with basing point price systems, and although within the scope of some of the general
language in the materials treating the field, is not properly speaking a basing point
price system, and is therefore not listed here.
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is less than the freight rates for the distance, the seller is said to
"absorb" the amount of the differential in freight.
The second phase of the system arises in the case where a seller
adopts as a basing point not one of its own mills, nor an arbitrary
freight center, but a basing point already in use by a rival seller. In
this case, if the seller has no mills at the basing point in use, all sales
(except by coincidence) will involve freight absorption or phantom
freight. In the steel industry, for example, when this system was in
use steel companies charged (spontaneously or not) on sales from mills
at any point to buyer at any point the freight which would be charged
on a shipment of the same amount of steel from Pittsburgh to the
buyer, irrespective of the actual locations involved in the sale.
(2) Multiple Basing Point System. The multiple basing point
system differs from the single basing point system only in the fact
that a number of basing points are designated in the industries using
this system,, and that freight charges on all sales are computed on the
basis of the actual freight from the nearest basing point to the buyer.
The results from a single basing point system might equally well be the
results under a multiple basing point system, except of course that they
would be on a smaller scale because of the reduction in distance differen-
tials which could be involved. The difference would be only a differ-
ence of degree, depending on the number of basing points selected and
their distribution throughout the country. As the number of basing
points increases, of course, basing point effects disappear, as the system
approaches as an asymptote a so-called mill-base system, which is
actually F. 0. B. pricing.
(3) Zone Pricing. Under this system flat delivered prices are
established within zones, whose boundaries are usually arranged to
compensate for differences in transportation costs involved. Systems
under which the quoted price "applies east of the Mississippi", or under
which prices vary west of the Rockies, or the system of the U. S. Post
Office, under which the price charged for the shipping service on parcels
increases by steps from one concentric band to another around the
point of shipment, all are examples of zone pricing.0 4
Pressure for Change
The principal complaints against basing point prices encountered
in the economic area of the marketing process covered, stemmed from
204. The last example, perhaps the most familiar, involving the familiar series of
circles around the point of shipment, is the poorest example here because it does not
involve merchandising activities. It may serve nonetheless as a useful illustration of
the meaning of zone pricing.
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consumers who were adversely affected by the phantom freight phe-
nomenon. °5 If an industry were concentrated in the Northeast, for
example, the basing point selected would probably be in the same
area. Then if a few isolated mills were developed in the South or in
the Far West, consumers who bought from them would naturally object
to the payment of freight charges computed from a Northeastern basing
point rather than from their actual point of shipment. Some shipper
complaints were also experienced in such areas, when it was found that
proximity to the customer did not produce a price differential, and
that non-price competition continued."' Shipper complaints, however,
were of course negligible, as no shipper would be obliged to employ
such a system unless there were such calculated elements of coercion
present within the industry as could be made a special subject of legal
complaint. The existence of any shipper complaints at all in such
a situation nevertheless serves as an indication that the inconveniences
of the basing point system are largely balanced off as between shipper
and customer. As between geographical areas it may be suggested that
there is a similar balance-off of interests adversely affected, as, in the
example used above, a Northeastern shipper could, using this price
system, compete with one located close to the market only by a process
of costly freight absorption which might far outweigh any advantage
which could be derived otherwise from non-price competition, while
the shipper close to the market would be able to locate there generally
at the expense of greater raw material shipping costs than those in the
areas to which the bulk of the industry had gravitated. These same
interests could be cited as balancing off consumers close to and those
distant from their source of supply.
There were in addition certain academic criticisms of the practice,
by authorities ranging from such experts as Professor McLaughlin all
the way downward, 0 7 some of them based on pure economic factors
and some based on suggestions of illegality or of offense to govern-
mental policy.
208
205. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, op. cit. s upra note 200, at 113.
See, for a general discussion of the controversies, articles by George, Basing
Points, Dun's Review, Sept., p. 14, Oct., p. 11, Nov., p. 22, 1948; FTC, THE BASING
POINT PRO13LEM (1941). See also Note, The Legality of Basing Point Price Systems,
45 HARv. L. REv. 548 (1932).
206. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, Op. cit. supra note 200, at 115.
See also BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION, ch. 7 (1936).
207. See McLaughlin, The Courts and the Robison -Pathan Act, 4 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 410, 412 (1937). The most vigorous critic of the system was FETTER,
MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931). On this work, see McLaughlin, Book Review,
45 HARv. L. REV. 395 (1931), and Means, Book Review, 32 COL. L. REV. 389 (1932).
208. Withrow, Basing Point and Freight-Zone Price Systems Under the Anti-
Trust Laws, 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 690 (1937) ; FTC, THE BASING POINT SYSTEM IN
THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY (1934). On the simplicity-of-computation factor, an
interesting parallel will be found in Jewell Ridge Coal Co. v. Local #6167, UMW,
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The following effects of the practice have been cited as indicating
its general undesirability: 209
First, that it indicated some degree of monopoly in the control of
the goods to be sold under this system.
Second, that discrimination among buyers does result from it, even
though there is no personal element and it is entirely arbitrary and
geographical.
Third, that buyers under the system are subject to unfair uncer-
tainty in being required to formulate business policy on the basis of
artificial pricing systems subject by the same arbitrary action to change.
As this factor in turn influences the buyer's selection of plant location,
calculation of market, and pricing policies for his own product, con-
siderable hazard is envisioned under it.
Fourth, that price competition at the basing point, or in the entire
selling industry, is reduced or eliminated by the existence of this system,
whether it arises calculatedly (which is considered likely) or spon-
taneously or haphazardly.
Fifth, that there is some tendency under this system to encourage
rather than to discourage wasteful cross-haulage, because of the
difficulty of separating freight absorption factors from others in the
determination by shippers to accept or to reject a potential customer.
That this is true can easily be seen, at least in the case where a market
is maintained at a loss in order to provide a cushion against a future
general business slump.
For these reasons, at least, the Federal Trade Commission in-
augurated a campaign against basing point prices soon after the pas-
sage of the Clayton Act, and pursued this campaign in the face of
several judicial reverses until what appears to be a fairly complete
victory was gained by 1948.
HISTORY OF THE BASING POINT LITIGATION
Pittsburgh Plus. The opening gun of the Federal Trade Com-
mission's Thirty Years' War against basing point prices was fired with
325 U.S. 161 (1945), dealing with computation of labor rates, as complicated by the
portal-to-portal. element. In Justice Murphy's opinion the question is left open as to
"the validity of agreements whereby, in a bona fide attempt to avoid complex diffi-
culties of computation, travel time is averaged or fixed at an arbitrary figure, and
underground miners are paid on that basis rather than according to their individual
travel time."
209. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, op. cit. supra note 200, at 111;
Withrow, supra note 208, at 691. See also authorities cited notes 205-208 supra.
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the institution of proceedings under the Clayton Act against the U. S.
Steel Corporation and other steel companies shortly after World War
J.21 The Clayton Act had been on the books since 1914, but it was
not until after the War that the Federal Trade Commission had
gathered enough momentum in its own operations, or that the implica-
tions of the Clayton Act had been sufficiently studied, for a project of
such magnitude as an attack on the steel price system prevalent through-
out this country.
The Pittsburgh-Plus system consisted basically of the use of Pitts-
burgh as a basing point for computation of transportation in quoting
prices for semi-finished rolled steel products to any buyer, even though
the actual shipment might be made from the Chicago area, from
Duluth, or from Birmingham rather than from the basing point,
Pittsburgh. A fixed differential was added to the Pittsburgh base
price in the case of shipments from Birmingham, and certain products
were excepted from the general system, tending to reduce its impact
in the Chicago area.
The Federal Trade Commission contended that this system
amounted to discrimination under the Clayton Act because of the
phantom freight and freight absorption involved in it; that is, that to
absorb freight of one buyer and to exact phantom freight from another
is discrimination; and that a tendency towards identical bids of differ-
ent sellers in Government contract negotiations and similar cases also
resulted from the system.
The U. S. Steel case resulted in a cease-and-desist order of the
Federal Trade Commission in 1924, based on a finding that the Pitts-
burgh-Plus system was both a violation of Section 2 of the Clayton
Act and "an unfair method of competition" under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act."1' There was no court fight on the
basis of the F. T. C. order, and the U. S. Steel Company did not even
file a court appeal until more than a decade later, when it was compelled
to do so to save its rights."' 2 A public statement was issued by the
defendants promising to comply with the order in so far as it was
practicable to do so, 21  and the truce thus joined brought active hos-
tilities on this particular area of the front to a standstill. The situation
remained static until finally the position of the steel industry was by-
passed by the success of the F. T. C. in the Cement salient.
210. U.S. Steel Corp., 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924). The best description of this case is in
Withrow, supra note 208, at 692, 710.
211. Ibid.
212. Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1946).
213. OPPENHEIm, The Basing Point Price Systemn, CASES ON TRADE REGULATIo
964 (1936), emphasizes the steel case and outlines this history. See also Withrow,
supra note 208, at 711, and Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 548 (1932).
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What the steel industry actually did under the 1924 F. T. C. order
was to convert to the multiple basing point system, 14 which action was
sanctioned by default by the F. T. C. until the passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act a decade later. The basing point established by the in-
dustry under the new system varied depending on the precise product,
so that there was one set of basing points for wire products, another
for tubes, and still another for ingots or sheet products. Under the
operation of this system it was found that prices remained close to those
which would have been charged under the original Pittsburgh-Plus
system, so that under a different pricing procedure the original price
levels remained.215
Some wonder has been expressed at the Commission's failure to
follow up its initial results in the steel industry case more vigorously,
216
but it seems that some light might be shed on this by considering the
fate the Commission met on other fronts of the basing-point price
battle in the decade following the first steel case.
Tempered Steel. The Federal Trade Commission, under the stat-
utory authority it enjoyed prior to 1936, might have anticipated success
in a basing point price case on one of several grounds: that a price-
fixing conspiracy existed, that a monopolistic control of prices was
exercised, that the system was employed as a means of unfair com-
petition, or that this system was inherently illegal as necessarily in-
volving one of the other grounds mentioned. Two cases decided under
the Sherman Act shortly after the first U. S. Steel case effectively ruled
out the latter as a possible ground of success in the Commission's con-
trol of basing point pricing. In Maple Floor Mfrs' Ass'n v. U. S.2 17
and Cement Mfrs' Po'otective Ass'n v. U. S.,218 both decided in 1925,
the rule of reason generally adopted as a yardstick for judging ques-
tions under the Sherman Act19 was applied to the use of the basing
point price system, with the result that the mere existence or use of a
basing point price system was held to be unobjectionable under that act
in the absence of collusion.
214. Withrow, stpra note 208, at 711.
215. Or sometimes higher levels. Id. at 712; Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 548, 551
(1932).
216. E.g., Withrow, supra note 208, at 712.
217. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
218. 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
219. On the "rule of reason" generally, see Handler, Industrial Mergers and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL. L. REv. 179 (1932) ; McLAUGHLIN, CASES ON THE FEDERAL
ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF ;HE U.S. 215 n. 51 (1933). The rule stems from Chief Justice
White's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). McLaughlin,
The Courts and the Robinson-Patnt Act, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PRo. 410 (1937) finds
a similar approach under the Clayton Act, and predicted (pro tunc) the same attitude
under the then new Robinson-Patman Act. See note 191, supra. For the application
in the two cases under discussion, see Withrow, supra note 208, at 697. It is true that
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Several other cases consolidated the net effect of these two deci-
sions,220 and dictum from a lower court indicated that the same reason-
ing would probably apply in a Clayton Act proceeding as well as in one
brought, like these cases, under the Sherman Act.221  Though there
had been no express determination under the Clayton Act, it appeared
that under both acts mere non-collusive use of the basing system was
not objectionable and that the court considered that each case was a
matter for ad hoc determination. The Commission's next attempt was
to secure legislation which would more directly attack these practices.
It was still convinced of the soundness of the objections it had urged
against the system, even in the face of various judicial rebuffs.
The Legislative Attack. The economic legislation of 1933 marked
the close of an era in Federal Trade Commission work, as the National
Recovery Act, in particular, amounted to a moratorium on all Sherman
and Clayton Act prosecution, and established a framework for official
Governmental sanction of all sorts of monopolistic combinations, in
the midst of which minor examples of impersonal discrimination in
pricing policies would be very small potatoes.22 Again, as the N. R. A.
passed, the Robinson-Patman Act was already en ventre Congressi, and
reorientation of Federal Trade Commission policy on prices neces-
sarily awaited its passage.
The Robinson-Patman Act itself presented no basing point price
issue in its passage, for it was advertised and debated primarily as an
anti-chain store measure designed to prevent local loss pricing by large
chain stores as an unfair means of competition. 2' As a sideshow, how-
ever, to the main question, the basing point price problem was raised,
and the history of this legislation gives some indication, in combination
in the Maple Flooring case the single basing point was close to all shipping points,
thus involving minimal amounts of phantom freight or freight absorption, 268 U.S. at
571, but in the Cement case this was not true, and in both cases the court gave atten-
tion to the administrative and economic justification for individual adoption of the
system. Thus the court was not relying on any de ininimis factor.
220. See Withrow, supra note 208, at 701; OPPENHEIM, Op. Cit. slpra note 213,
at 972.
221. See United States v. Corn Products Ref. Co., 234 Fed. 964, 994 (S.D. N.Y.
1916) (L. Hand, J.).
222. See OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 213, at 967. The definitive official dis-
cussion of the N.R.A. program is the REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMITTEE OF
INDUSTRIAL ANALYSIS ON THE N.R.A. (1937), which makes this point in its discus-
sion starting at p. 216.
223. See McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs and the Robinson-Patinan Act,
4 LAW & CoNTEmP. PRoB. 334 n. 1 (1937). A discussion not entirely from an open
viewpoint of the legislative history of this Act is Sammons, Half the Verdict Is in on
the Patinun Act in BusINEss AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 99 (Werne ed. 1938)
(a chrestomathy, mostly of reprinted materials better cited from the original source).
See also in the same collection at 152-171, Judkins, Trade Associations and the Recent
"Price Control" Legislation. See also generally ZORN AND FELDMAN, BUsINEss AND
THE NEW PRIcE LAWS (1937). See also History of the Robinson-Patnan Act, F.T.C.,.
App. 9 to TOULMIN, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS (1937).
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with other legislative attempts, of Congressional attitudes toward the
Federal Trade Commission campaign against basing points.
First, it was attempted by F. T. C. representatives in Congress to
eliminate in the Robinson-Patman Act its repetition of the Clayton Act
qualifications permitting sellers to lower their prices to meet competi-
tion. This attempt failed and the proviso was put in the Robinson-
Patman Act in substantially the same form as in the original Clayton
Act.
224
Second, it was attempted in the Robinson-Patman Act to outlaw
all pricing policies producing varying mill nets to the seller. This
provision, looking toward F. 0. B. pricing practices, was also defeated,
the judiciary committee of the House of Representatives specifically
concluding that the bill would not pass if it were included.2 5
Third, after the Robinson-Patman Act, an attempt was made to
pass an "anti-cross-haul" bill, requiring F. 0. B. pricing and thus
eliminating basing point systems. This bill also failed to pass. 226
Fourth, the Temporary National Economic Committee in its final
report suggested the outlawing of basing point prices by Congress, but
Congress ignored this suggestion even in the face of its repetition by
the Federal Trade Commission on two subsequent occasions.227
Thus concluded a legislative history in which the reluctance of
Congress to pass any curbs on basing point price systems as such was
made especially clear. But under the Robinson-Patman Act itself the
Federal Trade Commission soon launched a new attack against basing
point prices in several of the principal industries using them, charging
the collusive use of these systems in some cases, but also in others
testing out the possibility that the Robinson-Patman Act reached in-
dividual non-collusive use of these prices as well as basing point price
combinations of producers. This latest attack over the course of a five-
year period proved largely successful.
The Court Battle: Second Phase. The present law on basing point
prices rests partly on a few recent cases dealing with alleged con-
spiracies to use basing point systems as a type of price fixing combina-
tion. In another more significant group of cases, however, the issue
of the fundamental illegality of this system was developed ultimately
224. H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H.R. 10486, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936) ; 80 CoNG. REc. 8223 (1936). See Head, The Basing Point Cases, 26 HARV.
Bus. REv. 641, 644 (1948).
225. 80 CONG. REc. 8223-4, 8226-7 (1936).
226. S. 4055, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ; Head, supra note 224, at 644.
227. Report of the T.N.E.C. (1941) at 33; Head, supra note 224, at 644-5.
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on the assumption that no conspiracy was involved, and so there is
available at least some law on the policy issue.
The important conspiracy cases involved the salt and paper in-
dustries; the first included disclaimers of criticism of independent com-
petitive price policies of any type,22 and this position is supported by
language in other cases.2" 9 In the Paper case,2 " however, the language
of the court deviates considerably from this position, and indicates that
the result that a basing point price system is inherently bad might have
been reached even without the Syrup, Cement and Steel Pipe cases
on the ground that a showing of the use of a basing point system car-
ries with it a conclusive showing of conspiracy as well: that is, that the
use of basing point prices is per se conspiracy."a
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, starting in 1937, 1938, and
1939, a number of complaints were brought against different industries
using basing point prices, charging that even their individual use in-
volved a discrimination outlawed by the Robinson-Patman Act." 2
Out of these complaints came three leading cases, the Syrup case," 3
the Cement case,2 3 4 and the Steel Pipe case," 5 which contained the
framework of present Supreme Court law on basing point prices.
The Syrup case held that individual use of a single basing point
price system is illegal discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act,
because of the phantom freight involved in the system. The Cement
case necessarily involved only collusive action to employ basing
point prices, but is more important for the dictum in the opinion re-
lating to individual action in the absence of agreement. The piece
added to the framework by this dictum is that freight absorption, as
well as phantom freight, is, as a consistent result of a multiple basing
point system, a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Steel Pipe
case provides a decision to match the important dictum in the Cement
case, as a part of the Commission's order there specifically forbade any
individual price system other than a uniform mill net system.
228. Salt Producers' Ass'n v. F.T.C., 134 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1943).
229. See, e.g., Milk Can Inst. v. F.T.C., 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946).
230. Allied Paper Mills v. F.T.C., 168 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948).
231. See Head, supra note 224, at 654.
232. The net effect of this statute, of course, lay not in making unlawful what
had been previously lawful, but in dispensing with the necessity for proof of one of the
essential elements of the case, injury to competition.
233. Corn Products Refining Co. v. F.T.C., 324 U.S. 726 (1945) ; F.T.C. v. Staley
Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
234. F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
235. Triangle Conduit Co. v. F.T.C., 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aff'd, per nec.,
336 U.S. 956 (1949). (The "Rigid Steel Conduit" case.)
344 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Collateral decisions fill in the chinks in the structure in these
cases: in F. T. C. v. Morton Salt Company " the lack of need for an
affirmative showing of a reduction of competition under the Robinson-
Patnan Act is emphasized. In the National Lead case the Commission
has attacked zone pricing, and perhaps by implication even uniform
delivered prices; 2 7 and in the Standard Oil case it is indicated that
even a good faith effort to meet a competitor's price will not save a
system otherwise illegal.s But the nub of the matter is in the Syrup,
Cement, and Steel Pipe cases, so far as the basic illegality of the system
is concerned, for the other decisions merely supply collateral details.
Some attention will be given, then, to the reasoning of the Court in the
Syrup, and Cement cases, as embodying the key thinking on economic
policy relating to delivered prices.
ANALYSIS OF THE Syrup AND Cement OPINIONS
The Syrup case 1o was really two separate proceedings by the
F. T. C., one brought against the Corn Products Refining Company,
and the other brought against the Staley Manufacturing Company.
Both respondents were manufacturers of glucose (corn) syrup and
their principal customers for large shipments were candy manufacturers.
Both employed single basing point price systems. In both cases the
Commission found the systems employed to be unlawful discriminations
under Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, and issued cease-and-desist orders against such viola-
tions. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the order in
the Corn Products case and set it aside in the Staley case,240 the dis-
tinction between the two being obscure and a matter of divided opin-
ion.24' On certiorari the Supreme Court upheld the Commission in
both cases.
The bulk of the spadework was accomplished in the Corn Products
case, the points decided there being in summary as follows:
236. 334 U.S. 37 (1948). See a discussion of this case in Merrigan, Delivered
Pricing and Quantity Disco nts, 5 LoyoLA L. REv. 18, 51-56 (1949).
237. Supra note 170. See Merrigan, supra note 236, at 45; Head, suPra note 224,
at 647.
238. Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949) ; 49 CO. L. REv.
863 (1949) ; 62 HARv. L. REv. 1249 (1949). This decision goes sufficiently far that
even Administration thinking is not unified on it, and the Department of Justice and
the F.T.C. appear to have split in their views on this point: Business Week, Jan. 14,
1950, p. 15.
239. Corn Products Refining Co. v. F.T.C. and F.T.C. v. Staley Mfg. Co., supra,
note 233.
240. 144 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1944) (Corn Products) ; 144 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1944)
(Staley).
241. One judge in the latter case rested his opinion on the proof of an affirmative
defense by the respondent. See infra.
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a. A basing point price system, as it includes phantom freight
or freight absorption on different shipments, constitutes a violation
of the amended Clayton Act as a price discrimination.
24 2
b. The prohibition against price discrimination applies even
though the different purchasers involved are situated in different
localities rather than at the same delivery point.
243
c. The Maple Flooring case and the first Cement case do not
establish the legality of basing point systems under the Clayton
Act, as those were actually decided under the Sherman Act and
not under the Clayton Act.2"
d. The Maple Flooring and first Cement cases are also dis-
tinguishable on the ground that in the former freight variances
were trivial, and in the latter a multiple basing point price sys-
tem was involved.248
e. The legislative action in rejecting the bill outlawing basing
point price systems does not restrict the scope of the Clayton
Act, as the bill rejected would have required f. o. b. pricing and
would have prohibited all uniform delivered prices.
2 46
In the Staley case Chief Justice Stone, who wrote the opinions in
both cases, relied largely on the Corn Products case as deciding the
basic illegality of the basing point price system,-4 and devoted his at-
tention principally to the attempted defense that the Staley Company
adopted the system "in good faith to meet competition," unde" one of
the savings clauses in Section 2 of the Clayton Act. It was found that
the respondent had not met the burden, placed upon it by the Robinson-
Patman Act, of proving that its pricing system was justified, the Court
noting that what the respondent had done was not to make individual
basing point sales, or to absorb freight in individual cases, but rather
to adopt a whole system which in its nature involves price discrimina-
tion.248 The Court inserted an admonitory qualification that there
would be no discrimination in uniform delivered prices at all points of
delivery, and that this decision also failed to cover freight absorption to
meet competitors' prices.249
242. Corn Products Refining Co. v. F.T.C., 324 U.S. 726, 732-3 (1945).
243. Id. at 734.
244. Id. at 735.
245. Ibid.
246. Id. at 734. The remaining points in the Corn Products case related to weight
of evidence, the scope of the requirement of possible injury to competition, and the
inferences properly drawn by the F.T.C. from the evidence received.
247. F.T.C. v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 750-1 (1945).
248. Id. at 753-7.
249. Id. at 757.
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The evil in the system adopted by the Staley Co. was that under
it prices charged might sometimes be higher than competitors' prices,
rather than as low or lower, and that insofar as phantom freight was
charged to produce such a higher price the system was not within the
savings clause. It further appeared, however, from the tenor of the
opinion, that even if the system involved only freight absorption it did
not come within the savings clause if "slavishly followed" as a system
rather than consisting of isolated instances of price reduction to meet
competition.2 50
The Court thus abolished the weight of much of the dictum in the
Maple Flooring and first Cement cases, and ignored, except for two
brief disclaimers, the implication of the Syrup cases as to the validity
of other delivered price systems. The statement of the Court that it
found it unnecessary to decide the validity of multiple basing point
systems,25' and the statement that uniform delivered prices are valid as
not involving discrimination, pass over the hidden Government prem-
ise of the Commission's argument in the Syrup cases that a pricing
system must be judged as discriminatory or not on the question of
uniformity of mill net return: i.e., uniformity of delivered price less.
transportation charged. It is this which renders phantom freight and
freight absorption illegal, if anything expressed in the Commission's
argument does, for the only other result consistent with the validity of
uniform delivered prices and the invalidity of basing point prices is
the invalidity of f. o. b. pricing. Either transportation charges are a
part of the price for purposes of the Clayton Act or they are not; it
cannot be argued both ways.
252
Certainly the Syrup cases marked the biggest single step in the
outlawing of basing point prices, but this was not the step announced
by the Court; rather, it was the step involved in the compelling
similarities between the system here condemned and the systems here
specifically approved or specifically distinguished. For the combined
rule of these cases, that any systematic rather than desultory (in-
dividually justified) use of a system was discriminatory because of the
incidence of phantom freight or freight absorption, provided a tremen-
250. Id. at 754-5.
251. Corn Products Refining Co. v. F.T.C., 324 U.S. 726, 735 (1945).
252. An escape from this problem, not expressly adopted by the Court, would
permit the seller to determine whether transportation charges are to be included in his
price or not, and then require him to be uniform either in his mill price or. in his
delivered price. It is questionable whether the legislative history and the interpretation
of the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act would support this position without
carrying with it the validation of a uniformly applied compromise system such as a
basing point system. Certainly so far as economic effect is concerned, the overall
purport of the Clayton Act must cover uniform delivered prices if it covers any depar-
ture from f.o.b. pricing.
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dously satisfactory premise for the Commission in the arguments it
was to construct in the Cement case. The Commission was justified
to a considerable extent in taking the view that the way had been
cleared for the battle against other delivered price systems.253
The opinion in the Cement case, aside from some discussion
dealing with the purely procedural issues which were raised, may be
divided into two main portions. It had been contended before the
circuit court of appeals by the F. T. C. that basing point pricing sys-
tems involve collusion per se, and that hence multiple basing point
price systems are illegal if followed even on an individual basis.
2 55
After losing the case in the circuit court of appeals, the Commission
argued that its order applied only to collusive action and not to in-
dividual use of such pricing systems, and hence that the case should be
determined on the basis of a finding of conspiracy.256 The Supreme
Court's first point was that the Commission was correct in its position
that the order related only to conspiracy and that a conspiracy to use
a multiple basing point pricing system is illegal 57 The second part
of the Supreme Court's opinion is directed to the question, whether the
multiple basing point pricing system would have been illegal if there
had been no element of conspiracy involved. This portion of the opin-
ion would seem to be dictum, but it nevertheless lays down the limits
which, confirmed in the Steel Pipe case, establish current Court doctrine
on delivered prices.
258
On this latter point, i.e., the basic illegality of the basing point
price system in absence of conspiracy, the Court rested its conclusion
on the Syrup cases, saying that their combined effect was "to forbid
the adoption . . . of any basing point pricing system".2 5 9 This is
certainly not inconsistent with the decisions in the Syrup cases, which
upheld the F. T. C. orders involved, nor with the general language of
those cases, which meticulously refrained from specifying that the
systems in use were, as they were, single basing point systems; but it is
difficult to reconcile with the statement in the Syrup cases that the
253. See Business Week, Basing Point Decisions, April 28, 1945, p. 5, and Basing
Point Pricing Under Fire, May 5, 1945, p. 22.
254. F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
'255. See Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. F.T.C., 157 F.2d 533, 558 (7th Cir. 1946).
The F.T.C. decision itself was as to at least one count in terms of combination: 37
F.T.C. 87 (1943).
256. See the extracts of argument, 92 L. Ed. at 1016-1018, including the point that
"The court below misapprehended the meaning . . . of the . . . order," p.
1018, and the stress placed on "combination" and "conspiracy" throughout. See also
Head, supra note 224, at 648.
257. F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 720 (1948).
258. This is not, of course, to say that the Steel Pipe case was actually decided
in advance, but merely that some very strong clues were given as to what the Court's
position would be in the latter case as a matter of consistency in language.
259. 333 U.S. at 723.
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Court need not decide there whether the basing point system used in
the cement industry is permissible under the Robinson-Patman Act.26
No other serious objection can be raised to that part of the reason-
ing of the Court in the Cement case which bears on the central pricing-
policy problem except that so far as the Cement case was con-
cerned it was, by the Court's own admission, dictum. The opinion
is closely reasoned under its premises, which appear to be as follows:
a. Any basing point price system involves normally both
phantom freight and freight absorption, and this is as much true
of multiple basing point systems as of the single basing point
system.
261
b. Phantom freight and freight absorption result in dis-
crimination among purchasers, as prices must for the purposes of
this Act be calculated at the mill of the seller. 2  (Here is the
weakest point in this case, so far as the premises supporting it are
concerned.)
c. There is nothing in the legislative history of the acts under
which the F. T. C. brought this proceeding which is inconsistent
with the conclusion that basing point price systems are illegal.
2 3
d. The previously decided Syrup cases, read together, estab-
lish the position of this Court that such systems are illegal.
26
e. There is nothing in the procedure followed by the Com-
mission, or in the opinions formed and expressed in advance by
individual members privately and by the Commission officially on
the legality of these price systems, which denied the respondents
the fairness required by the due process clause.
265
f. The findings of the Commission on the maintenance of the
basing point system in this case, and the evidence supporting the
findings, were adequate. 66
On the conspiracy point one difficulty arises which is probably
inherent in the Federal law of conspiracy rather than in the judicial
reasoning of this particular case, but which is exceptionable here as
elsewhere. Some companies contended that they should be given special
consideration because of 'proof of differences between their practices
260. Supra note 251.
261. 333 U.S. at 723-4.
262. Id. at 725-6.
263. Id. at 724. (Relying on the Syrup cases.)
264. Id. at 723.
265. Id. at 700-703.
266. Id. at 709-720.
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and those of other defendants. The Court said that this merely in-
dicated that "some respondents were more active and influential in the
combination than were others, and that some companies probably un-
willingly abandoned competitive practices and entered into the com-
bination." 267 Though some defendants had not participated in all the
steps of the conspiracy, they were held equally responsible, as members
of the Cement Institute. 68
The Court, however, did mention a point which would seem to go
far in meeting the argument of these defendants: that evidence showed
"that the delivered prices of these respondents, like those of all the
other respondents, were, with rare exceptions, identical with the de-
livered prices of all their competitors".269 If the essential element in
the price system is the price actually charged, and not the method of
reaching it, then this point would seem sufficient to establish the case,
if, indeed, individual rather than collusive use of the basing point sys-
tem would suffice to sustain the charge, although perhaps not other-
wise. Even in conspiracy cases this point would seem to go far in
justifying inferences of submerged collusive relationships.
On the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings, the
reasoning of the Court is unobjectionable if we overlook the reliance
on feel rather than on concrete testimony. The administrative "expert
feel" concept plays a part in the language of the Court that "we are
persuaded that the Commission's long and close examination of the
question it here decided has provided it with precisely the experience
that fits it for performance of its statutory duty. The kind of special-
ized knowledge Congress wanted its agency to have was an expertness
that would fit it to stop at the threshold every unfair trade practise-
that kind of practice which, if left alone, 'destroys competition and
establishes monopoly'." 270 Again the Court said, "we cannot say that
the Commission is wrong in concluding that the delivered-price system
. would result in complete destruction of competition and the
establishment of monopoly . . 271 in terms strongly reminiscent
of the Dobson Rule 72 and its tendency in application toward findings
of administrative infallibility on questions of law.
267. Id. at 718-19.
268. Id. at 719.
269. Ibid.
270. Id. at 720. On the importance of maintenance of competition even against
the effects of conditions in a given industry, note the Court's references to the Sugar
Institute cases: "The fact that, because sugar is a standardized commodity, there is a
strong tendency to uniformity of price makes it the more important that such op-
portunities as may exist for fair competition should not be impaired." 333 U.S. at
715. No reason is stated here, and without further discussion of the problems of
standardized-product industries the statement appears unduly pontifical.
271. Id. at 720-1.
272. Dobson v. Comm'r, and comment thereon, sipra note 121.
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Mr. Justice Burton's dissent 27 pointed out that the majority opin-
ion involved a repudiation of the factual basis on which the case had
proceeded in the lower court, and failed to answer, because of this
repudiation, the question actually presented by the appeal.
S. this Court today has held not only that the Commission
found the existence of the combination as charged, but that such
finding is sufficiently supported by evidence in the record. This
Court accordingly has applied the law of the case to a set of facts
which includes a combination. . . . The resulting effect is that
the Court below has held that without such a combination there
was not the alleged violation . . . yet on the other hand, this
Court has held that including such a combination, there was a
violation. . . . This Court, therefore, has not here determined
the relation, if any, of either of the foregoing statutes to the
absorption of freight charges by individuals when not participating
in a combination.. ,, 274
Although the dissenting justice did not stress the point, what he
here said involves a characterization of all that the majority said re-
lating to individual non-collusive activity as dictum.
With the position of the Court on basing point prices as of the
Cement decision fairly well established, the next objective is to examine
the effect of the decision, legally and economically.
THE EFFECT OF THE BASING POINT CASES
An apparent feeling of outrage has taken hold of businessmen
since the Cement case. A tremendous flood of criticism has appeared
in business literature, as well as in legal periodicals." 5 Many of those
273. Justices Douglas and Jackson took no part in the Cement cases, but their
absence cannot be taken as affecting the outcome; even though Jackson's concurrence
in the result of the Syrup cases was somewhat ambiguous and might indicate that he
would draw a line between those cases and the Cement case, at most it would seem
that the absent justices were "paired" in this case.
274. 333 U.S. at 731-3.
275. There is an excellent note by Blaxter, Delivered Prices and the Cenent
Institute Decision: A Suggestion for Legislative Treatment, 10 U. OF PiTT. L. REv.
67 (1948), and a more extended discussion in an article by Merrigan, Delivered Pric-
ing and Quantity Discounts, 5 LoyoLA L. R!v. 18 (1949), which also discusses the
Syrup cases. See also Head, Validity Under the Robinson-Patinan Act of a Uniform
Delivered Price of One Seller, 31 MINN. L. REv. 599 (1947) ; Hilder, The Attack
Upon Delivered Price Systems, 14 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 397 (1946). Supporting the
result of the cases are two articles by Wooden, of counsel in the FTC in the cases:
The Defense of Delivered Price Systems, 15 GFo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 1 (1946), and
Validity Under the Robinson-Patman Act of a Uniform Delivered Price of One Seller,
32 MINN. L. REv. 129 (1948), as well as a note, Basing Point Pricing and Anti-Trust
Policy, 55 YALE L.J. 558 (1946). A discussion without a clear thesis pro or con is
Edwards, Delivered Prices: Doing Business Under the Present Law, 47 MIcE. L.
REV. 743 (1949). See also, more recently, Smithies, Economic Consequences of the
Basing Point Decisions, 63 HARV. L. REv. 308 (1949), and a symposium, Delivered
Pricing, 15 LAW & CONvuEMP. PROB. No. 2 (1950). Among comments in business
literature are Head, The Basing Point Cases, 26 HARv. Bus. REv. 656 (1948) ; Bliss,
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who have written have been frankly speaking from an advocate's point
of view, and this has, of course, reduced the objectivity of their treat-
ment, 7 much of which appears to reflect the heated nature of the
policy debate now being waged in legislative halls and elsewhere. From
the discussions available, a number of specific points emerge by way of
criticism and otherwise.
Disregard of legislative intent. The most serious objection to the
decision, as judicial action, would seem to be that the Court disregarded
the intent 2 77 of Congress in the matter of basing point' price curbs, and
was thus legislating, not interstitially, but on a frolic of its own . 7
The Court disclaimed this, saying that the language of Congress did
not amount to legislative approval of basing point prices, and that it did
not affect the previous meaning of existing legislation, 279 but as the
Some Field Notes on Freight Absorption, 26 HAgv. Bus. REv. 656 (1948) ; Foy, The
Essentials of the Steel Producers Right to Compete (address before the 1948 Eco-
nomic Institute, United States Chamber of Commerce, Dec. 9, 1948), making a point
of inconsistency in the approach of the FTC, itself; Fortune, Sept. 1948, p. 73. As a
further symptom of the reaction, in the 1949 session of Congress remedial legislation
was proposed by Senator Johnson, S. 236, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), see the N.Y.
Times, Jan. 4, 1949, p. 27 Cols. 2-3; and semi-remedial and clarifying legislation pro-
posed by Senator Myers, S. 1008, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) (popularly known as
the O'Mahoney Bill) ; see Time, June 13, 1948, p. 88, col. 3. On other legislative
proposals see Merrigan, stpra at 49-51.
276. A striking example of this is the debate which was carried on, supra note 275,
by Mr. Wooden and Mr. Hilder concerning the soundness of the Syrup decisions.
There is an old saw about more heat than light being generated by certain types of
debate; this seems applicable to these discussions. Mr. Wooden, for example, rejoins
to Mr. Hilder's argument in one of his articles by taking each of the latter's proposi-
tions separately, quoting them, and then stating an opposite conclusion, without analy-
sis or evaluation, as a complete snub. See, e.g., The Defense of Delivered Price Sys-
tents, 15 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 1, at 20 (1946) : "Mr. Hilder concedes that delivered
prices which make due allowances for differences in delivery cost are not discrimina-
tory, that this is a reasonable interpretation of the statute, and that 'to this extent there
should be no quarrel with the Commission's due allowance argument' (p. 417). He
objects, however, to the converse as a non sequitur. Unless the converse be true, we
would have a condition where not only the delivered prices are lawful which make due
allowance for differences in delivery cost but also delivered prices which do not make
such allowance, in which event it would seem impossible to have unlawful discrimina-
tion in delivered prices at all."
And also at page 5: "To contend that the system does not produce the discrimina-
tions, as the article does at page 401, is in conflict with the concession at page 419 that
it does produce identical -delivered prices. For it is the identity of delivered prices
at various places that automatically reflects the systematic variation in mill-net prices
of the respective sellers which constitutes the discrimination. Moreover, it is a logical
impossibility to consider the legal status of discriminatory prices without considering
whatever it is that causes or accounts for them. The assumption that the same prices
would or could exist without the system has nothing to support it. Proponents of
delivered price systems are concerned with more basic matter than that of mere con-
venience in accomplishing what would be the result anyway."
The propriety of such "discrimination" goes to the main issue of the argument, so
this is equivalent to saying, "If he is right, than I am wrong"; to which a suitable re-
buttal might be, "Q.E.D."
277. Or "intendment," as it is called by the Court. 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948).
278. See Blaxter, supra note 275, at 71; Head, supra note 275, passim.
279. 333 U.S. 683, at 692-3 and 724 (1948) ; see also Corn Products Refining Co.
v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 737 (1945).
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cases were brought by the Commission under the Robinson-Patman
Act and decided under that Act it would seem that the Court was
primarily bound by the scope of that legislation, unless it wished to
articulate a reliance on the meaning of the unamended Clayton Act.
In matching these decisions with the Robinson-Patman Act, it seems
that a rather distinct departure from legislative instructions can be
made out, in view of the express and repeated Congressional refusal
to include basing point prices within the legislative pattern.
One or two counter-arguments might be advanced, based on the
fact that the disregard of legislative intent, if any there was, consisted
of a decision not contrary to the letter of the statute, but inconsistent
with expressions of the legislators who were concerned with the pas-
sage of the statute, and with the refusal to pass other statutes.
It might be urged, first, that the Court's interpretation of the
statute may not properly take into consideration such matters as legis-
lative hearings, floor debates, and other statements of legislators, but
that a rule something like the parol evidence rule limits the process of
statutory interpretation, so that the letter of the statute is the sole
governing criterion as to the "intent" of the legislature. These are
deep waters, and it is not desired here to compare subjective and objec-
tive standards of statutory interpretation generally, although it may be
suggested that the objective standard can easily be carried to a point of
absurdity."' ° Against this it can only be urged that evidence of actual
legislative intent is plentiful and explicit, and that at least as to the
statutes which were proposed and not passed, the objective test fails
altogether; for there the only evidence goes to explain the lack of any
statute at all, rather than the meaning of an existing statute.
The Failure to Produce the Desired Effect. Considering the net
economic effect of the basing point cases, the question is raised, whether
the decisions will actually foster competition-as a phase of the stat-
utory policy-as they are intended.8 ' This question may be ap-
280. Cf. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REv. 616, 624
(1949) as to the omission of the word, "not," from the statutory text, and, at 625, as
to the difference between lay and legal statutory interpretation. There is precedent
for the use of the objective standard in price policy legislation. See, e.g., George Van
Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929). This decision is called
"correction of error" in McLaughlin, The Courts and The Robinson-Patinm Act:
Possibilities of Strict Construction, 4 LAw & CONTEMp. PRoa. 410, 412 (1937), thus
joining in the criticism of the use of legislative history in interpretation of the Clayton
Act in Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759
(1923); and in National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 Fed. 733 (2d Cir. 1924), cert.
denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1924). See on the last two cases, Note, 38 HARv. L. Rav. 103
(1924). The Court did, however, in the Syrup cases, purport to look behind the words
of the statute. E.g., FTC v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U.S. 746, 752
(1945) ; so justification in the Van Camp case cannot necessarily be relied on.
281. See supra note 275, Head, at 653; Blaxter, at 72; Foy, at 2; Edwards, at 745.
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proached from several angles. First, it may be suggested that the
industries in which basing point prices are likely to rise initially will
be just those which, because of their size, the large capital investments
involved in manufacturing and other matters mentioned above, are
not adapted to the most free competition under any regulatory system.
Assuming that this is not an insuperable difficulty, however, it still
remains to ask whether a clear criterion has been established for deter-
mining whether competition exists to a desirable degree, and for de-
termining how to restore it where it has disappeared.
The confusion of criteria established here is shown in the failure
to draw a clear distinction between basing point prices and delivered
prices. Is mill net the standard of price? If it is, then what about the
validity of a uniform delivered price? If it is not, then what is the test?
Can it be a problem of individual harm? If so, then why must freight
absorption necessarily invalidate a pricing policy?
So far as the effect of the decision on a uniform delivered price is
concerned, no positive prediction can be made, in view of the con-
flicting dicta in the Syrup cases, which say that such a pricing policy
is not bad,282 and the Cement case, which says that such a policy is
bad.2" Another difficulty in adopting the mill net price as the defini-
tion of price under the Act is in the meaning of the proviso which
allows a seller to meet the price of a competitor by lowering his own
price. Does this "price" to be met mean mill net price? Further, if
the policy of the statute looks to net return to the seller in determining
the existence of discrimination, then why should this return be figured
by eliminating transportation costs alone rather than considering that
labor and materials costs and overhead must also be left out of account
in determining whether a price is discriminatory2 4 (thus making all
sales contracts in effect cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts)?
It may also be pointed out, to contribute to the confusion which
appears to attend this question, that there are in actuality several levels
of the basing point price problem. The number will vary, but gen-
erally we may say that there are three levels, involving sales of ore
and coal at one, of iron and steel at the second, and of automobiles and
refrigerators at the third. It is certainly not clear that buyers generally
will benefit from the basing point decisions, unless we can discount
282. See FTC v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945).
283. See 333 U.S. 683, 725 (1948). See Edwards, supra note 275, at 755, on this
inconsistency in dicta. Lowell Mason is quoted in Fortune, mspra note 275, as saying
the rule applies "from pins and needles on up," and the Harvard Law Review (1949)
advertises its complete set as f.o.b., although the cumulative index may still be pur-
chased under a delivered price.
284. See Blaxter, mcpra note 275, at 69; Edwards, supra note 275, at 752.
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the effect on most buyers as sellers. If a fundamental economic policy
underlies the decisions, then to be sound it must consider both points
of. view of the average businessman, and determine whether he will
be hurt as a seller before counting the eggs which have been hatched
for him as a buyer."'
The essence of this criticism is to say that the reasoning surround-
ing the F. T. C. position in this field is cloudy; it fails to establish
that these decisions will have a beneficent result, either on the concept
of free competition or on the country's economy generally. A separate
criticism has been made that it is possible to predict the economic effect
of these decisions, and that that effect is not a desirable one s.2 6  Special
consideration will be given next to that criticism.
The limitation on the scope of competition. There is certainly
some narrowing of the scope of competition involved in these decisions,
which reflect a tendency to eliminate the bargaining concept from
American commerce.
The argument here is that where the product is a heavy item of
standard quality and low unit cost, competition is mostly in price in a
free field: that is, basing point prices are necessary here, as a com-
petitor's price must be met where there is no room for other competi-
tion: 217 "cement is cement." Non-price competition generally includes
quality and service, differentiation of the product (other than qualita-
tive), consumer advertising, and trade promotion. 88 Of these, how-
ever, only the first reflects any difference in benefit to the consumer in
the ordinary case, while the others involve only psychological appeals,
but if it is true that in the industries such as cement and steel there is
virtually no room for competition in this first area, then, while the
other three remain, activity in those areas is not likely to result in
ultimate consumer benefit, the guiding light of the FTC position in
pricing policies.
It has been more specifically said that the effect of these decisions
on competition will be to "Balkanize" the country, so that a manufac-
turer who has previously been able to afford to build a plant in a given
area will be protected by an "umbrella of governmentally imposed price
285. On the difficulties of tracing cost elements of price generally see Hamilton,
Cost as a Standard for Price, 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 321, 328 (1937). See note
114 supra. See also McNair, supra note 223, at 347.
286. See Head, supra note 275, at 653-5; Edwards, supra note 275, at 743-6; and,
generally, the business literature material cited in note 275 spra tends to this criticism.
287. See Merrigan, supra note 275, at 36-7; the first Cement case, Cement Manu-
facturers Protective Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 591 (1925) ; and the
FTC in the second Cement case, 37 F.T.C. 87 (1943).
288. See Alderson, The Effect of Price Controls on Non-Price Competition, 4
LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 356 (1937) for a discussion of these functions.
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monopoly" in the area closest to his shipping point.2 9 This provincial-
ization of the country seems a reasonably probable consequence, but if
free competition is impossible in such industries, it may not be, without
more, a bad thing. In considering whether there are other factors
which render provincialization of industry bad for the Country, it may
be well to consider the situation of a businessman in a part of the coun-
try not highly developed industrially-that is, the specific effect of the
basing point decisions on a Southern manufacturer, for instance.2 9
Assume a unit costing $95 at the normal mill price, plus $5 freight
from Pittsburgh, for a total $100 price to a consumer in C town. The
actual freight from M ville, where the manufacturer is, to C town is
$10. To meet the price of a Pittsburgh manufacturer, the Southern
manufacturer must cut his mill price to $90, and to compete with others
closer than Pittsburgh, he must cut his mill price even further, ap-
proaching a lower limit of $85. In a competitive or slow market, and
where $95, the normal mill price, has been closely figured, such a price
cut may prove ruinous for the Southern manufacturer, although, of
course, in sellers' markets some of the slack may be taken up by raises
in price by Pittsburgh and closer manufacturers, under the Principle of
Maximum Return, to reduce the price cut the Southern manufacturer
must take to compete."9 ' It may seem illusory to complain of this
situation, as even under Pittsburgh-Plus the Southern manufacturers'
price to the C-town consumer will be only $90 mill net, after consider-
ing freight absorption, but under a mill base the closer customers will
also insist on a $90 or less mill price, and the loss will be considerably
greater to the Southern manufacturer if he is to try to compete for
Northern markets, when the delivered prices in competition must tend
to be fixed by those available from closer mills.
There will be some provincialization of markets inevitable in this
process, as the market for steel and rubber in Michigan, for food for
processing in Great Lakes areas and in New Jersey, and for textiles in
New England, is large enough to be a significant price-fixing factor.
Depending on the shipping rates for raw cotton and for yard goods, it
might prove profitable in the long run for textile mills, for instance,
289. See supra note 275: Blaxter, at 73-4; Foy, at 2; Edwards, at 751. See also
on competition under the Cement case generally, Mason, The Current Status of the
Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1265, 1266-7 (1949). An
instance of this feared consequence becoming actuality is reported in Business Week,
Jan. 7, 1950, p. 24, cols. 2-3, a report dealing with industrial shifts occasioned by the
end of basing point prices. Cf. the evasion plan advertised in Business Week, Jan. 21,
1950, pp. 24-25.
290. This example is adapted from that used by Mr. Foy, Vtpra note 275, in terms
of Steeltown and Motorville, with alterations to point up the effect on a businessman
in the South.
291. It is difficult to see how this process helps the consumer, the stated beneficiary
of the basing-point decisions and of The Robinson-Patman Act.
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under this law, to move closer to their markets in the Northeast, so that
shipping costs will again become a cost item and subject to their control
in fixing prices-that is, a part of the mill price. The other answer is
to develop Southern markets for Southern manufacturers-provincial-
ization of the country from another point of view-but that process is
under a handicap so long as there are other effective sources of the
commodity desired. There is no incentive for the market to move
except to approach, for an advantage, a source of supply.
This criticism is perhaps from the point of view of governmental
economic policy the most telling of those made, although, of course,
even it represents some oversimplification, as fluctuations in the cycle
will provide some cushion against the business shifts which might other-
wise be entailed from the decisions. It has also been suggested that
"the rigidity of price structures in many industries will be lessened" 292
-in other words, that the principle of uniformity may suffer on a time
scale as homage is paid to it on the price scale at any moment of a given
seller. This is just another way of phrasing the criticism discussed
above, that the effect of the decisions is not certain or predictable, rather
than saying that it is predictable and undesirable. The two criticisms
are not consistent, but the dilemma they pose raises a question as to
whether a process of attempted economic regulation has not once again
gone awry.
The Enlarged Definition of Conspiracy and Collusion. It seems
that apart from economic effect, these cases had a significance in legal
theory, whose desirability is questionable, in making it easier to prove
collusion than would be the case in judging the charge according to the
tests imposed in determining various types of individual criminal lia-
bility or even tort liability."' It may be noted that under the Syrup
cases a general basing point system is found to be prima facie dis-
criminatory under section 2 (a) of the statute, 94 but this discriminatory
effect is not permitted to be rebutted so far as the system itself is con-
cerned, under section 2 (b).95 What is sauce for the goose appears
not to be sauce for the gander, and this again marks an enlargement
of the law as known before, even in the field of conspiracy.
The collusion argument points up a peculiar sensitivity of the
Government in dealing with associations such as the Cement Institute,
292. See Blaxter, supra note 275, at 74.
293. See Mason, supra note 289, at 1280 as stating that these cases involve an
enlarged definition of collusion. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Mason agrees
with the result in the Cement case, on the collusion point. Id. at 1279.
294. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945); FTC v.
A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
295. Id. at 753, 755.
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as against the attitude toward the individual. An illuminating ques-
tion to ask is, why do people have associations if the Government
always attacks them, and if one can be found guilty as a member of the
association of what he would not be guilty of individually? The
answer to this may lie in the fact that an association may be able to
develop influence in the legislature where its individual members could
not, and thus presents a greater hazard to the program of an adminis-
trative element of the Government such as the FTC. The vehemence
of governmental attacks on those lobbyists who oppose the program of
the administration, 2 6 while ignoring those who support it, may serve
as further indication of this sensitivity; but it may be suggested that
this first fact is an unhealthy factor if the Government is not to become
unduly centralized or sycophantic, and that it might be well to bear
in mind the merits of such lobbyist groups, in evaluating the desirability
of special hazards set in their path by such rules as the collusion rule
involved in these cases.
These specific criticisms are directed here to the theory or to the
economic policy of the specific cases here under discussion, but do not
serve to answer the point whether, good or bad, these cases form a part
of an unsatisfactory over-all economic program. To treat that point
is the next objective.
TiiE ANATOMY OF DISCRIMINATION
In determining the particularized meaning of discrimination under
the recent basing point cases, a good starting point seems to be the
following definition, taken from the report of the Conference Committee
on the Robinson-Patman Act just before its final passage:
"In its meaning as simple English, a discrimination is more
than a mere difference. Underlying the meaning of the word is
the idea that some relationship exists between the parties to the
discrimination which entitles them to equal treatment, whereby the
difference granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage upon
the other . . . But where no such relationship exists, where the
goods are sold in different markets and the conditions affecting
those markets set different price levels for them, the sale to differ-
ent customers at those different prices would not constitute a dis-
crimination within the meaning of this bill." 29T
The judicial application of the Act has not, of course, followed
quite the line indicated by this definition. The question to be solved
296. "Real estate lobbies" and "the medical lobby," as well as manufacturers' and
business groups, have been officially and publicly criticized as "wicked" by responsible
governmental officials, in addition to the normal and proper attacks by political candi-
dates, for their positions in opposition to the program.
297. Representative Utterback, 80 CONG. Rlc. 9416 (1936).
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is, just what is the ultimate criterion to guide the courts in determining
whether a discrimination exists under these cases?
According to the definition above, a mere existence of a difference
would not be controlling on the question of discrimination, and this is
obviously so, as under the language of the Act the difference must be
as to "commodities of like grade and quality" and must also be beyond
the scope of "due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale or delivery resulting from . . . differing methods or quanti-
ties . ... "298 The Act itself, then, specifically eliminates cases where
there is a difference in quantity, quality, or marketing procedure. These
provisos have been judicially circumscribed to a certain extent,2 9 but
there remains a substantial area to support the statement that a mere
price differential without more does not create discrimination.
Indeed, suppose there is no price differential, the question still
exists as to whether there might not be discrimination. Here again
it seems that disproportionate quantity, trade, or functional discounts
may render prices discriminatory even though there is no difference in
the basic price or even in the actual price charged.300 It would seem
that a differential is neither necessary nor sufficient in making out a
case of discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act. If the exist-
ence of a price difference fails as the primary indicator in determining
discrimination, what new lodestone may be substituted in charting this
area of the law?
Statutory and judicial language suggests here that the test lies in
the effect of the pricing practice on competition."0' All the statutory
rules, under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Clayton Act,
and the Robinson-Patman Act alike, have been developed to implement
a general policy of furtherance of free competition in American business.
The task here can be reduced to that of defining more precisely the
298. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946) (Clayton Act).
299. See McNair, supra note 223, for a discussion of the importance of standard
discounts and of their judicial interpretation under the Clayton Act. The most note-
worthy restriction on the original sense of these words was in the Sears-Roebuck case.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 92 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1937), rev'd, 304 U.S.
257 (1938), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939).
300. Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929). See also
American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 899 (1931); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 92 F.2d 677 (6th Cir.
1937), rev'd, 304 U.S. 257 (1938), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939). See also Mc-
Allister, Price Control by Law in the U.S.: A Survey, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 273,
291 (1937). On discriminatory though equal railroad rates for differing services, see
3-B SHAREMAN, THE INTERSTATE COmmERcE ComMIssIoN, 556-7 (1936), and authori-
ties cited at 416n. and 417n.
301. See 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1946) (Robinson-Patman Act);
Learned and Isaacs, The Robinson-Patinan Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations,
15 HARv. Bus. REv. 137 (1937) ; Mason, supra note 289; McNair, mtpra note 223, at
355.
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exact type of competition, injury to which may render a pricing practice
discriminatory.
A priori; statutory restrictions on pricing policy seem to be gen-
erally calculated to restrict competition, rather than to liberate it. 02
This paradox may be resolved, however, by noting that in certain large
industries competition unchecked tends in the course of time to destroy
itself, particularly where the pasturage in the available area of com-
petition is insufficient for more than a few to partake. In this light,
the regulation of competition to preserve competition becomes theo-
retically comprehensible.
It may still be asked, however, whether the concern of the court in
protecting "competition" in these cases is in reality the protection of
competition or the protecting of a competitor. If it is the latter, then
it cannot be the former, for competition presupposes two equalities
turned loose in the ring of strife together, and this approach would
provide one of those two with a second to insure that competition is
maintained within narrower rather than broader limits.
An elusive question is whether the competition to be preserved is
that of the seller or of the buyer. At just what level of the market do
these statutes seek to maintain competition? The indication above of
the several levels of the market between ore and automobiles, for in-
stance, was calculated to show that the basing point decisions may have
unexpected indirect consequences; 303 but here it shows that it might
be necessary to choose between two areas of competition even at any
one level of the market.30 4
Generally speaking, price regulation is calculated for the protection
of the consumer.3 03  From the consumers' point of view a price is a
delivered price and includes the shipping costs he must pay, but the
basing point cases indicate that a price is something else. They indicate
vast importance in the return to the seller in determining whether a
price is discriminatory, and move one step away from the equality of
delivered price toward equality of net return to the seller in determining
discrimination. They have not indicated why other manufacturing
costs should not be treated the same way as freight absorption for this
purpose, or where the line is to be drawn between equality of delivered
price and equality of net return to the seller. Of course, considerations
302. On this shift "from the Preservation of Competition between Manufacturers
to the Control of their Prices," see Burns, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation
of Price Competition, 4 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 301, 308 (1937). See also, in general,
LOEViNGER, THE LAW OF FREE ENTERPRISE (1949).
303. See note 285 supra.
304. As to railroad rates, see 3-B SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 300, at 559.
305. See Ely, The Work of the Federal Trade Comninission, 7 Wis. L. REv. 195
(1932).
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of internal efficiency become necessary when costs other than shipping
costs are to be taken into account, and it might be unwise to open up
a field of regulation in which such matters are to be probed. However,
such differences in efficiency have not been considered to justify price
differentials for the same article, or even, semble, for different articles,
under the Goodyear-Sears Roebuck case."  Further, every functional
discount, and possibly some trade discounts, may raise questions of the
propriety of a seller's inquiry into the internal efficiency of the buyers'
processes. The subject is not satisfactorily excluded.
In a related area, that of discriminatory railroad rates, it seems
that the competition which is to be preserved is that of the shippers and
not that of the carriers. Similarly, under the Van Camp 0I and Good-
year-Sears Roebuck .8 cases, it seems that under the price regulation
laws the competition which is important is that of the purchasers and
not that of the sellers, although there were some inconsistent earlier
cases. It seems that the Robinson-Patman Act makes this point even
clearer, so that it should be possible to measure discrimination by con-
sidering the situation of the consumer only.
The basing point cases, however, mark a sharp departure from the
line of the Van Camp case, insofar as they tend to define discrimination
not in terms of the effect on the person acted against, but rather of that
on the actor himself. Insofar as the equality of net return to the seller
is important in determining discrimination under the basing point cases,.
they are not concerned with the effect on competition among pur-
chasers; they are concerned with competitive interests among sellers
and not among consumers. On the other hand, insofar as they are
concerned with the economic effect of price differences on' the buyers,
and with the preservation of competition among buyers, they are within
a more commonly recognized sense of the term discrimination, and in
addition would seem to be closer to the expressed word of the govern-
ing statute. It is submitted that the cases do not make the answer clear
whether discrimination is to be found by examining the situation of
the seller or by examining that of the buyer. It may be said that the
seller is examined to determine whether there is a differential, and the
buyer, to determine whether it is injurious; it does not seem proper to
take the question both ways in this manner, as the ultimate problem is
whether a price is discriminatory, and this approach involves looking
at price both from the point of view of the buyer (who thinks only of
delivered price) and of the seller (who is concerned primarily with
profit margin) in answering the same legal question.
306. See note 299 supra. Here is the golden eggs aspect of the basing point cases.
307. See note 280 supra.
308. See note 299 supra.
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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: TRANSPORTATION COSTS
AND CHARGES
Looking at this field one sees tumuli of many an accepted
institution of a quarter century since, but few of these bear case
names. Yet here lies unmarked all that was mortal of the old Cement
case, the Maple Flooring case, and the Texas & Pacific R. R. case, not
to mention the doubtful fate of the Diffenbaugh case and of the Mech-
ling case, which might be determined by probing nearby. The previous
detailed criticism of New York v. United States, and of the basing-
point cases, however, has not been designed here to show these cases
wrong within their context, as a primary purpose, but rather to com-
plete a critical study of two important pillars of governmental economic
policy. Those older cases, with their virility sapped by the recent deci-
sions, have become as shadows in the law, and a study resting on their
precedent merits would seem a dry and brittle thing. One may say
here with Motley: "Even the most devout of genealogists might shud-
der to chronicle the long succession of so many illustrious obscure." 3o9
Neither is it here the place to preach for change in the law as it
exists under the rate case or the basing-point cases, because a law
review article is at best a sophotaph,3 10 and because to do so would
obscure the central thesis of an argument for consistency at either
price."' Criticisms have been developed in considering the precise
nature of either of these cases -as a piece of legal tissue. It may be
inferred, for instance, from some of the language above that a ruling is
not altogether fortunate which places a penalty on bigness even where
its effects are beneficent, 1 2 or on efficiency because efficiency breeds
bigness, or vice versa. This would seem to be too blind a worship of
the competition god, or too broad an association with the Other Thing
-monopoly. Further, the overcomplacent reliance on administrative
expertise and the overfree arrogation of power not exercised by Con-
gress has been seen some cause for concern. A rule depending on the
impartiality of the executive in enforcement has the protective stability
of a bundling board, even where popular sentiment has not accepted,
except in a few municipal environments, the concept of the veniality of
309. 1 MOrEY, THE RISE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLic 25 (1855).
310. See REPORT OF THE CO-MMITTEE ON TEACHING AND EXAMINATION METHODS,
ASsoCiATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS (1949).
311. That is, to avoid the "hydrostatic paradox of controversy." See HOLMES,
AUTOcRAT OF THE BREAK.FAST TABLE 114 (4th ed. 1891).
312. This question may underly the prosecutions of the DuPont and A. & P. Com-
panies, though the issues have not been judicially discussed except in United States v.
New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946), as they
affect those cases. The same problem affects the consideration of the Sears Roebuck
case, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 92 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1937), revzd, 304
U.S. 257 (1938), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939).
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venality. But this thesis is directed primarily to the question of con-
sistency, and if these two bodies of law cannot coexist consistently
within an integrated governmental policy, then neither can the bulk
of the criticisms directed to them exist together, so far as they are
aimed at substantive policy.
With this disclaimer the matter of policy in economic regulation
may be approached, and here is esculent material to be found.
At the smallpox death of the Emperor Tungchih and his wife, just
about a lifetime ago, it was said that "Fate is under governmental con-
trol in China." 3" This view cannot be altogether accepted, at least as to
most modern governments, 14 and if it is considered that fallible human
processes are being used to regulate economics, then it is a natural
source of concern if these processes do not support one another.
Economic legislation, it would seem, must not only usually contain
its "exceptis excipiendis" but must always be prefaced by its "ceteris
paribus". Economic laws are always in hypotheticals, and the flaw in the
planning and regulatory processes is that economic legislation changes
the condition and not the law: e.g. If incentive, then production; if a
four-hour week and secured future, then production in a different light.
The If clause in the laws of economics contains blanks which are open
to the legislature to fill in. The Then clause follows inexorably from
what the lawmakers, judicial or otherwise, have provided. It is pos-
sible, then, by way of evaluation of the cases under study, to summarize
first their purport in terms of economic effect, that is, in terms of the
If clause they have constructed, with some attempt at projection of the
Then clause, and then to contrast the two pictures to complete the thesis
as to their consistency in policy.
First there is the railroad rate case. The medium through which
policy is there expressed is the question whether those charges were,
in a specialized sense, discriminatory. The criticisms developed in the
discussion of New York v. United States are directed largely to the
propriety of the underlying economic policy of the case: whether the
reasonableness of a rate might be determined on any other basis than
the classical rate base; whether it was proper to adjust the inequality
313. See ScimoMRE, CHINA: THE LONG-LIVED EMPmE 119 (1900).
314. See LANCASTER, CLASSICAL LANDSCAPE WrrH FIGU Es 62 (1948), as to
rugged individualism in modern Greece: "It had been intended by the city fathers that
the future development of Athens should be an orderly southward expansion, eventually
linking the city with the port of Piraeus, and plans to this effect had in fact been
drawn up. Before, however, they could be carried into effect a shrewd Athenian of
the period, operating along lines exactly opposed to those which have been so success-
fully pursued by land-speculators in our own country, bought up all the land he could
lay his hands on to the north of the town. As he had anticipated the Athenian public,
the moment it was suggested to them by the powers-that-be that they should dwell to
the south, straightway rushed out and bought building sites in exactly the opposite
direction, and the psychologist's future was made."
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of rates by raising the rates of the Northern railroads without a finding
that those rates were unreasonable; and whether the criteria suggested
in determining the propriety of the rate order were actually given due
judicial consideration.
Taking a point of view a little further removed, it is difficult to
sustain these criticisms in sweeping terms. It does not seem, for in-
stance, that the rate base is a sacred thing, fixed for all courts and
times; it varies in circumference as the times are feast or famine, like
an ungulant's equator; 315 there is no reason why it might not be re-
quired to vary to meet the needs of the Country as well as to conform
to the state of the Country. There is something more of a problem as
to whether the justifying factors cited in such a case are really given
consideration. A simple computation of the time involved in a study
of the data adduced by the Commission in this case raises a problem as
to whether the Court could give the material de novo consideration,
even if it be suggested in this article that to do otherwise would be to
rely overmuch on administrative justice. Further, in such a com-
plicated case there are plenty of data which can be cited for either side,
creating a temptation to handle the case on a broad policy base-that
is, to set up certain presumptions to be overcome, which is the same
thing-and then to support the position taken by gleaned data ad lib.
These criticisms have pointed to the existence of an underlying
policy base for the case, but have not pointed specifically to the nature
of such policy. In approaching this, a start will be made with a sug-
gested epitome of the interstate commerce rate law prior to New York
v. United States. The general rule, then, is that a rate is proper if
reasonable-i.e., if it yields a fair return on the rate base.316 An excep-
tion is that even such a rate is not proper if it involves undue preference
or discrimination." 7 There is preference or discrimination if there
315. With suitable apology to Professor Powell. See also, on the effects of gen-
eral economic conditions on transportation policy, Hearings before Committee on
Interstate Commerce on S. 942, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 213, especially the part containing
Thurman Arnold's memorandum and testimony. A later collection of materials on
the problem will be found in a symposium, Interterritorial Freight Rates, 12 LAW &
CONT-MP. PRoB. 391 (1947). Compare also, with the New York v. United States
decision, Ayrshire Collieries Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 573 (1949), which held
that the I.C.C. can compel equal rates from points of origin in the same group even
without a finding that there are being charged different rates for items moving under
substantially similar circumstances. On the application of the anti-trust laws to rate
bureau practices (providing an interesting parallel to the practices of such agencies as
the Cement Manufacturers' Association and other possible price-fixing agencies oper-
ating by agreement) see a Note, Railroad Rate Bureaus and the Anti-Trust Laws, 46
Col- L. REv. 990 (1946).
316. See 3-B SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 300, at 425 on the relative weight
given to value of service and to cost of service in fixing rates.
317. Under sections 3 and 4 of the Act. See 3-B SHAPYMAN, op. cit. supra note
300, at 521-572, on preference, prejudice, and discrimination generally.
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is a difference not justified by cost differentials.3 18  Such preference
or discrimination is "undue" if it hurts in shipper competition.3 19 In
determining this, makeweight factors which may be considered are the
commercial effects, including the desired degree of carrier competition
and the question, whether an adjustment not of the rate complained of,
but of the other rate involved in the discrimination, would actually help
the complaining party. 2' Under these rules, there were a number of
proof difficulties, and the location of the burden of proof was always an
important factor.32 '
The policy shift which seems to underlie New York v. United
States consists in a greater emphasis on commercial factors to justify
adjustment of rates. This is by no means a completely new departure
in this field. A striking example, (not relied on as a precedent by the
Supreme Court) of such an approach was in the Lake Cargo Coal case
twenty years earlier.3 22 The fate of the Commission's orders in that
case was inconclusive, depending in part on court action and in part on
political determinations," but the case is sufficient to show that the
factors considered here were not being given weight for the first time.
24
On the point that cost factors cannot always be judged precisely,
it has been noted that traffic density is not always justification for a
low rate, 25 as then density may be the effect as well as the cause
(justification) of a rate. 2" Such a statement invites the suggestion
318. Id. at 559, n. 442.
319. Id. at 560, n. 423.
320. Id. at 562, n. 429 containing the excerpt from Bunker Hill Co. v. Northern
Pacific R.R., 129 I.C.C. 242, 246 (1927). See also, 2 SHARFMAN, op. cit. Mepra note
300, at 382 n. 58 on the consideration of factors other than the core of the rate base.
321. See especially Eastman, concurring in part, in Carthage Pulp & Board Co.
v. Pa. R.R., 177 I.C.C. 217, 244 (1931), and in Acme Mills v. Alabama Great Southern
R.R., 136 I.C.C. 114, 118 (1927) and Duluth Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago, St.
P., M. & 0. R.R., 122 I.C.C. 739, 743 (1927), as contrasted with the dissent in Duluth
Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R.R., supra at 744 and the con-
curring opinion in Acme Mills v. Alabama Great Southern R.R., supra at 120. These
and other authorities on the point are listed in 3-B SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 300,
at 562 n. 428 and 566 n. 435.
322. Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 101 I.C.C. 513 (1925), further hearing, 126 I.C.C.
309 (1927) ; Lake Cargo Coal from Ky., Tenn., Va., and W. Va. to Lake Erie Ports,
139 I.C.C. 367 (1928) ; Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F.2d 462 (S.D. W. Va.
1928).
323. See 3-B SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 300, at 661 on this controversy.
324. Hearings, supra note 315. In the Lake Cargo case itself, however, the Com-
mission disclaimed any primary reliance on commercial factors, saying "It is no part
of our duty to canvass and compare . . . the social and economic conditions
stressed by this intervener with the view of adjusting the rate structure to them."
126 I.C.C. 309, 359 (1927). And, "We have neither the inclination, the wisdom, nor
the power to make or regulate rates for the purpose of determining whether goods
shall be bought or sold, produced, manufactured, or consumed in one section or locality,
or by one set of persons or another." 139 I.C.C. 367, 391 (1928).
325. See 3-B SHARFmAN, op. cit. supra note 300, at 514, 570 and authorities at 570
n. 444.
326. See id. at 688 and 690, concerning the effect of transportation costs on local
economy, absolutely and relatively.
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of some other factor which may be helpful to putting the rate on a fixed
base rather than in a boot-strap situation where it is both cause and
effect. Among other factors which have been given consideration are
competitive factors,3 27 which have been of significance but whose spurs
have been pre-empted to a considerable degree by the policy expressions
underlying the Transportation Act of 1920. The remaining factor,
then, is the commercial factor, including the distribution of traffic on
a "fair-share" basis, and the ultimate economic effect of rate levels and
rate systems.325 Although these commercial factors have a respectable
place in the over-all subject, it has been emphasized that prosperity
factors alone cannot be conclusive, 29 and that there must be some
justification for their consideration other than an attempt by the I. C. C.
to regulate the economy beyond the area of the transportation system
itself.3
30
But assuming that the purpose of the order was to improve the
state of the economy in the South, then it must be regarded as a ter-
ritorial subsidy. In considering whether such a subsidy is a proper
expression of policy, one may look both to precedents and to statements
of value judgment for its justification. It cannot be denied that there
is precedent for such a subsidy. The post-war American loans to Great
Britain and other countries (assuming there to have been no mutual
intent that such loans should ever be repaid), the Federal Emergency
Relief Act of 1933, which provided that one-half the fund appropriated
might be used for outright grants to states which could not meet the
fund-matching provisions of the Act,331 and the current proposed legis-
lation for education subsidies to certain states,332 are all examples.
On the other hand, it could be noted that equalization is not the
only factor to be taken into account in bolstering territorial economy,
and it must be observed that that cannot be given to Paul which has not
been taken from Peter. Senator Taft, for instance, noted in connection
with recent legislation relaxing international trade restrictions that this
327. See id. at 572-656.
328. See id. at 656-693.
329. See id. at 561 and n. 426.
330. See id. at 685. See also 1 id. at 223 n. 95.
331. 48 STAT. 55 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §609c-1 (1946).
332. See editorial in the Boston Herald, May 2, 1949; the point was also de-
veloped, critically, by Connecticut's Republican Chairman Baldwin, in an address on
August 30, 1949, The Boston Herald, Aug. 31, 1949, pointing out that money freed by
such a subsidy from educational uses might be used to compete with the non-subsidized
states, as by the tax exemptions granted an industry to induce its removal from Con-
necticut to Texas. This, of course, is merely a phase of the economic leveling policy,
involved, for goad or for bad, in the case under discussion. A contrary trend is repre-
sented by the 1949 Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is probably too
early to evaluate its effect in the provincialization of economy, though it is clear that
union agreements equalizing wage levels on a country-wide basis have retarded, if not
reversed, the industrial migration to the south, as the labor and cost differential van-
ishes.
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is "good for the world, but bad for the U. S.; we average down as
the poorer sections of the world average up". 333  Similarly, what is
given to the South under a policy such as that found in New York v.
United States is also taken away from some other part of the Country,
and this should not be done without the most careful consideration of
the fairness of doing so. Also, there is the problem of whether this
eliminates the premium on efficiency by establishing a new law of dis-
crimination. Here is the golden-eggs point, as, of course, to the extent
that incentive for efficiency is removed, efficiency itself is likely to wane.
The golden-eggs point, of course, poses a dilemma as to what should be
done in handling a backward area, the two horns being a policy
calculated to change the laws of economics, or a policy calculated to
change the philosophy of a government founded on premises of laisses
faire 3 34 and free and equal competition.
Now let us compare the territorial freight rate cases with the
delivered price cases. In the latter field the law of the future is not
entirely set as changes may be effected by the decisions in con-
troversies yet pending. Also practical considerations may even impel
an administrative retreat from the position won. The prospect of
remedial legislation is not certain, and both the Johnson 33 5 and
O'Mahoney bills 36 have thus far failed to become law; but an F. T. C.
compromise with the steel industry on the general terms of the latter
bill has been reported,337 and there has been some indication also of
Commission reluctance to proceed with further prosecutions implement-
ing the Syrup decisions.33 The Commission may have reached the
point of no returns in these prosecutions, but this solution does not
destroy the legal worth of the Supreme Court cases, which still stand
as an indication of Court thinking in this area.
Whatever the anti-trust acts 339 might have meant originally, the
rite of determination by the Supreme Court has given them in this area
the transferred meaning that pricing policies are objectionable when they
333. News reports, Sept. 25, 1949.
334. Ci-devant.
335. See note 275 supra.
336. See note 275 supra. The O'Mahoney Bill passed Congress in a somewhat
altered form in June, 1950, but was vetoed by the President, leaving the matter of
legislative alteration in this field still up in the air. That thought is still active on
the underlying problem, whether transportation, or distribution, costs the economy too
much, see a report of an address by Wroe Alderson, sponsored by the United States
Chamber of Commerce, delivered in Detroit before the National Marketing Conference,
in Business Week, Mar. 11, 1950, p. 98, col. 2.
337. Delivered Pricing Is Legal-by Fiat, Business Week, Nov. 12, 1949, p. 19,
col. 1.
338. Robert S. Allen in The Boston Herald, Nov. 21, 1949. See also note 238
mtpra, on difficulties in handling the Standard Oil case.
339. Dedicated to the principle that might is not right, and employed in the
interests of divorcing right from might.
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enable a distant seller to compete on equal terms, pricewise, with a local
seller. This has been done by an extension of the meaning of the term
"discrimination", but the economic policy inextricably linked with the
decisions is that, other things being equal, the economies of the various
territories of the country must stand alone, and attempts to reach across
territorial boundaries to draw strength from markets in "foreign"
territories are to be discouraged.
The internal criticism of this policy decision is that it does not only
what Congress has failed to do, but what Congress has refused to do.
This instance is not unique among courts and administrative tribunals,
and other examples can be found in recent times; 340 but the fact that
this is customary does not make it right. Within the framework
handed down, the legislature can be overruled only on existing Con-
stitutional grounds; but these cases indicate that it is not only in the
field of Constitutional Law that the distinction between a court and a
constitutional convention may have been overlooked.
And having examined these two fields what do we find? Consis-
tency certainly there is not. Under New York v. United States, a rail-
road with lines in both the North and the South would be required
to violate the net return rule of equality in price, that is, it would be
forced to discriminate between Northern and Southern shippers under
the rule of net return. This does not indicate, however, that there is a
fundamental distinction between the two disciplines as to the meaning
of the word "discriminatory", as the Interstate Commerce Comnmiission
has considered the desirability of a "postage-stamp" freight rate, and
criticized it as possibly discriminatory,34' although in an inconclusive
340. As by an administrative commission, when the Federal Communications Com-
mission barred "giveaway" radio programs, relying more on their general and un-
deniable undesirability than on its statutory powers (no official citation is yet available,
as F.C.C. reports are almost two years in arrears, and advance sheets are not available
in law libraries near Boston. See Broadcasting Magazine, Aug. 22, 1949, p. 18, col. 1,
noting especially Commissioner Hennock's dissent at page 28, which stresses the point
that the Commission was acting without specific statutory authority in promulgating
these rules. See also Time, Aug. 22, 1949, p. 80, col. 3), and by a court when the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the Labor Department's power to
sue to collect overtime even if the workers had not sued (McComb v. Frank Scerbo
& Sons, 177 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1949)), after Congress refused to grant such power
(Time, Aug. 29, 1949, p. 73, col. 1), Judge Learned Hand saying in a special concur-
rence in the case that "The (Labor Department) ought to have the power . . .
many deserving claims might otherwise be lost," (p. 140) thus relying more on con-
siderations of desirability than on the sense of the statute. See a criticism of such
judicial conduct in Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 157
F.2d 533, 573 (7th Cir. 1946) (the lower court Cement case). See also Hamilton,
Trade Regulation, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE 59, 82 (1946) : "The other day a judge
. . . came to preside in a criminal suit under the Sherman Act. His rulings for
the first day and a half represented the old-time severities; then it dawned on him that
his real task was to amend (sic) the pattern of an industry, not to guard the rights of
the accused. At once he liberalized his rules for the admission of testimony." Mirabile
dictu.
341. 3-B SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 300, at 689, and especially n. 660.
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fashion; and it has been remarked that the I. C. C. at least needs "a
more carefully articulated enunciation of majority views on basic
matters in the interests of clarifying policy"."
What has been said must be taken as only the statement of a prima
facie case. It is not possible always to derive an inconsistency of
philosophies from external manifestations, which may wander erratically
as the hypocycloid, being yet always bound to a determined focal point,
and returning always and again to a point of origin.
Again, the policy conflict disclosed on these two points is not
unique, and has been found elsewhere even within the limited field of
trade regulation. 4' But again its existence should not be taken as
also an excuse for being. An epigrammatic judge has said that "con-
sistency is the hobgoblin of small minds"; "' but this seems an unduly
cavalier dismissal of a prime requirement for fairness anywhere, and
in this area not only for fairness, but also for ultimate welfare of the
interest protected.
The question of policy to be determined may be phrased as
whether the nation shall in this field subsidize backward areas as it has
done in the operations of some of its other departments, or whether it
shall accept the possibility of a natural death of an area as a lesser evil
than the expense of artificial respiration.34 5 A national interest which
might be assigned as barring such a hands-off policy is the interest in
decentralizing for defense, but this interest cannot be closely evaluated
without being considered in the same forum with all the others which
may be affected. If the economy is to be decentralized, then consumer-
benefit and individual-fairness rules must be re-examined to see whether
they are accomplishing enough of their objectives to offset the braking
effect on the territorial subsidy.
Perhaps the kernel of the difficulty is not that departmental policies
may be superficially inconsistent, but that such inconsistencies in broad
policy can exist unnoticed. If this is symptomatic, it is an indication
of the need for placing an economic policy coordinator in some such
government branch as the Department of Commerce, 846 rather than
342. Id. at 764.
343. As in the case of the Sherman Act and the N.R.A., for example. If the
effect of the 1949 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act (-upra note 332) is
marked, it will stand as another example of such a policy conflict, taken in conjunction
with the manipulation of transportation costs by ICC.
344. Paraphrasing EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS AND ENGLISH TRAITS 70
(Harv. Classics ed. 1909).
345. As the Italy of 2000 years ago and the Great Britain of 200 years ago have
perished from the face of the earth, they may stand as examples of the fact of
mortality.
346. Such an agency, of course, to be capable of a consistent long-range view,
beyond the scope of political mortality, should be in personal tenure and in functional
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leaving its independent administrative competitors (agencies which
belong to it functionally but not administratively) to attack blindly their
own fragments of the economic elephant.
If a constitution must be "short and obscure",1 7 then perhaps
similarly the basic economic policy of a country must be difficult of
definition. Perhaps in the background is a moving force which tolls
off the milestones toward its objective patiently, like the clepsydra, and
which may not be offended by a right hand which defines discrimina-
tion in a Pickwickian sense, while a left hand does so in a para-
Pickwickian sense. The difficulty with this concept, however, is that
it ignores the human factor in government. If there is such a central
force, whose function is it to control it? More important, does the
agency which ought to exercise this function do so consciously? If
the Supreme Court, for instance, is charged with this objective, must
there not properly be some attempt to relate individual decisions to a
formulated ground plan, the same for railroad rates as for pricing
policies? A contemporary ambassador is quoted as telling his staff,
"We must now decide just what is our official position, so that when
we depart from it we will know what we are departing from".3 48  It is
the thesis of this study that the same requirement applies to our
Government.
responsibility an independent agency, not responsible solely to the executive. See a
discussion of the problems arising otherwise (in connection with the work of the
Council of Economic Advisers created by the Unemployment Act of 1946, 60 STAT.
23, 15 U.S.C. 1021-24 (1946)), in Nourse, Why I Had to Step Aside, Colliers, Feb.
18, p. 13, col. 1.
347. Winston Churchill, before the Council of Europe's Assembly at Strasbourg,
1949, quoting Napoleon.
348. Ambassador Franks. See Time, Sept. 26, 1949, p. 30, col. 1.
